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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 6, 1975, the International Monetary Market (IMM) of 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange initiated trading in futures contracts 
for the delivery of U.S. Treasury bills. Until that time, futures 
markets had traditionally been associated with the intertemporal 
exchange of agricultural commodities. With the introduction of 
Treasury futures, however, tlie concepts of commodity futures trading 
have been applied to one of the most basic of all commodities - money. 
Like all other commodities, money has a price - the interest rate 
which must be paid for its use. In theory, supply and demand for money 
ultimately determines its price. However, unlike most commodities 
which are supplied by numerous individuals or firms, the supply of 
money is basically determined by the Federal Reserve System. As long 
as the demand for money is relatively stable and the supply of money 
is permitted to increase in accordance with the financial needs of 
a growing economy, the price of money should not vary substantially 
over time. In fact, histuzlc^l time series of interest rates show 
•chat until recent years, interest rate stability was fairly typical 
of the U.S. economy. 
Over the Icist 10 to 15 ^^ears, however.- tP-onev 
markets have experienced a much greater variability in the prices 
of financial securities traded in these markets. This is due, in 
part, to a seemingly insatiable demand for money and credit 
expansion in both the private and public sectors of the economy. The 
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Federal Reserve System is faced with a difficult choice. If the 
money supply is allowed to grow proportionally to the surge in 
demand, inflation may be exacerbated. On the other hand, if the 
Federal Reserve System retards the growth of the monetary aggregates, 
then interest rates are likely to rise. The difficulty lies in the 
fact that it is not possible to control both interest rates and the 
stock of money simultaneously. 
As the goals of the Federal Reserve System have changed and as 
its ability to control the money stock has come under question, it 
has become clear that interest rates have become more volatile now 
than at any time in the past. Evidence of the volatility of short 
term rates is illustrated in Figure 1.1 which shows a twenty-five 
year time series in 90-day Treasury bill rates. As a result of 
this interest rate volatility, financial institutions whose major 
assets and liabilities are composed of interest-sensitive securities 
hav(= bepn subject to increased uncertainty with respect to the value 
of those securities. Unstable interest rates have been the primary 
motivation for the development and subsequent growth of Treasury 
futures markets. 
With the existence of these markets, financial institutions 
have the opportunity to hedge the market risk of their cash trans­
actions by taking positions in the futures markets opposite to these 
in tne cash market. At une same time, the futures market also 
afford speculators the opportunity to profit from the risks of 
i i .L c z» L, J. cs. cc o . j. i itr w ^ . iO >-*>5 
i.wjC 
o 
Jf 
I 
ff® 
IP 
.o ®® w 
o 
e 
V® 
c: 4-) cn c: (U o :3 nJ 
•~j o < n 
j- XI Q- aj 
._L 
55
5 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
95
9 CD (.O 
cn 
CVI 
LO 
cn 55
5 
m 
cn 
lO (T* 
LD 
UD 
CT» 
kO 
cn cn 
CO 
LO 
cn 
cn 
KD 
cn 
cn 
vo 
cn 
o 
cn cn 
C\J 
cn 
CO 
cn 
r-> 
cr> 
If) 
a> 
r— r- r- 1 r-
' 
r— r— r— 1— r~" r— 
De
c.
 
Oc
t.
 
Au
g.
 
Ju
n 
.
 
5. 
-t Fe
b.
 
De
c.
 
Oc
t.
 
Au
g.
 
Ju
n.
 
Ap
r.
 
Fe
b.
 
De
c.
 
Oc
t.
 
Au
g.
 
Ju
n.
 
Ap
r.
 
Fe
b.
 
De
c.
 
Oc
t.
 
J__L i_l—1 
CTi CTi 
cn 
3 
O") 
C 5-- (-> 
rj cj. (u OJ 
'"D <i; U. Q 
I' i 'jure ] . 1. Volatility oJ: the DD-dav 'treasury hill (now issue) rate over time, 1555-1980 
(U.S. DepartiiKMil. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current 
litis i ne'.s.s ) 
4 
been recognized for many years wit±i respect to other commodities which 
are characterized by volatile prices. Thus, it was only natural that 
Treasury securities should be treated in the same fashion once the 
need became apparent. Interest rate volatility creates interest rate 
risk and the existence of Treasury futures markets provides the oppor­
tunity to manage that risk, whether it be to reduce it or profit 
from it. 
Futures contracts for 90-day Treasury bills were first traded 
on the IMM and subsequently, similar contracts were introduced and 
are currently trading on the Amex Commodities Exchange, Inc. (ACE), 
an affiliate of the American Stock Exchange and on the Commodity 
Exchange, Inc. (Comex). The New York Futures Exchange (NYFE), a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the New York Stock Exchange, plans to 
begin trading in Treasury futures in the spring, 1980. 
The 90-day Treasury bill futures market has been widely used 
and the n'omber of market participants has expanded greatly. Among the 
active participants are commercial banks, savings and loan associa­
tions, securities dealers, mortgage bankers, pension funds and 
financial corporations in addition to the futures industry itself, 
which consists of commodity pools and funds as well as individual 
traders. The rapid growth in the 90-day Treasury bill futures marker 
is illustrated in Tablz 1.1, which shows the steady increase in the 
open interest of 30-day bill futures. Open interest is the total 
number of fu'iures contracts cf a civen commodity which have not 
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Table 1.1. Open Interest of 90-day Treasury Bills (CFTC permanent records] 
Open Open 
Date Interest Date Interest 
January 1976 358 January 1978 12,392 
February 1975 586 February 1578 13,645 
March 1976 890 March 1978 15,585 
April 1976 1,278 April 1978 17,583 
May 1976 1,424 May 1978 20,283 
June 1976 1,529 June 1978 23,684 
July 1976 1,721 July 1978 27,548 
August 1976 2,015 August 1978 34,580 
September 1976 1,928 September 1978 33,956 
October 1976 2,031 October 1978 48,024 
November 1976 2,333 November 1978 52,500 
December 1976 3,081 December 1978 58,985 
.T a v-^r 1977 2;688 January 1979 53,691 
February 1977 3,055 February 1979 54,172 
March 1977 4,108 March 1979 52,567 
April 1977 5,239 April 1979 56,355 
May 1977 6,403 May 1979 63,238 
June 1977 7,055 June 1979 60;962 
July 1977 8,668 July 1979 46,667 
August 1977 10,430 August 1979 38,917 
September 1977 10,726 September 1979 41,399 
October 1977 12,292 October 1979 35,377 
November 1977 14,145 November 1979 42,690 
December 1977 16,902 December 1979 35,945 
^Average monthly open interest. 
^Monrh end ooen interest. 
delivery of the commodity. 
^ ^ ^ ^ —. —* ^ ^ y-, ^ 
s—wO wO 
Wirh -he increase in activity and vol'-L~e in uhe 90-day Treasury 
bill futures markets, the question arises as to wnetr.er or net rnis 
market provides any net social benefits or costs to society. In the 
case of agricultural commodities, it has been well-documented 
that there exist certain public benefits that arise as a result of 
trading in commodity futures. For example, it is generally accepted 
that one of the most importemt benefits of trading grain futures 
is the price discovery signals that the futures market provides re­
garding the storage of grain over time. In the aggregate, the array 
of grain futures prices extant at a particular point in time pro­
vides spot market participants with valuable information regarding 
how much grain to store and when to store it. Thus, the prices 
provided by the grain futures market are crucial to the orderly 
flow and distribution of grain over time. 
To assess the benefits or costs of trading Treasury futures, 
it is essential to determine how the futures market is interrelated 
with the cash market. After all, the benefits or costs which result 
from an active futures market will in some manner be transmitted 
to the cash market. Therefore, in order to determine the effects of 
futures trading, it is necessary to examine the structural rela­
tionship between rhe two markets. Because most of the information 
produced by a futures market is embodied in prices, the relationship 
of prices between the futures and cash markets will be analyzed. Th 
will be important for two reasons: to determine the value of infor­
mation produced in the futures market and secondly, to assess the 
effects that futures trading has on the stability of prices in the 
cash market. 
Value of information 
Interest rate expectations form an important part of economic 
and business planning and they enter into both micro and macroeconomic 
models at many different levels. Because interest rate expectations 
are so widely used, the accuracy of their source is important. Esti­
mates of expected interest rates may be obtained from private surveys 
or they can be estimated from the current term structure of interest 
rates. With the commencement of futures trading in Treasury securi­
ties, yet another source of interest rate expectations is now avail­
able . 
It would seem plausible that interest rate expectations derived 
from each of the above sources should be consistent with one another 
over time. Therefore, the question arises whether the value of in­
formation supplied by the futures market is diminished if futures 
rates are not consistent with the information derived from other 
sources, for example, the term structure of interest rates. The 
consistency between these two sources of information m^ay be determined 
by analyzing the price structure between the futures market and 
the cash market. If it can be shown that futures prices and cash 
prices are structured in such a way that the futures rates are 
consistent (not necessarily identical) with expected races derived 
from the cash market, then the futures market for 9G-day Treasury bill 
will prove to be a valuable and inexpensive source of information on 
s 
stability of cash prices 
An analysis of the futures-cash price structure is also im­
portant to assess the potential costs that trading in Treasury bill 
futures market may have on the cash market. If the futures con­
tract is priced efficiently with respect to the cash market, then 
there will exist a futures-cash price link ::hrough v.'hich aberrations 
occurring in the futures market will be transmitted to the cash market. 
For example, rhe Treasury and Federal Reserve System share the con­
cern that destabilizing speculation or futures market squeezes will 
have disruptive effects on prices in the cash market. If futures 
market activities create more volatility in the cash prices of 
Treasury bills, then these securities may exhibit less liquidity and 
the Treasury Department may find it more difficult to market them. 
As a consequence, the Treasury's ability to manage the Nation's 
debt may be impaired, making it more expensive to finance public 
programs. 
Whether iû is concluded that the futures market for Treasury bills 
produces ne- benefits or net costs will ultimately depend on a thorough 
examination of the futures-cash price structure. The issue of the 
price structure has been addressed by a number of authors. Although 
T- "P •*- r-. .T» V-\V-1—. T r 1 /-\ 1 1 CT t.7/-\ v-V 1-vTvC ^ r-> 4- ^ 
relevant with respect to the effects of futures trading on the cash 
market. 
Much of the analysis regarding the price structure has been 
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concerned with testing for the efficiency of the futures market. Most 
of the tests postulate that if the futures market is efficient, then 
the futures rate will be equal to the forward rate implied in the term 
structure. If the two are identical, the conclusion then follows 
that the estimates of interest rate expectations produced in the 
futures market are consistent with those in the cash market. Other 
studies have set out to test for the validity of the pure expecta­
tions hypothesis which says that forward rates implied in the term 
structure are unbiased estimates of futures spot rates. This approach 
ass'jip.es that futures rates are unbiased estimates of future spot 
rates and thus, these tests also compare forward rates with futures 
rates. According to these tests, the validity of the pure expecta­
tions hypothesis is supported if it is found that the forward and 
futures rates are identical over time. 
Most of the theories which concern the price structure between 
t'ns futures and cash market conclude at one point or another that the 
forward rate should equal the futures rate. In this instance, expec­
tations produced in the futures market are considered re be consistent 
with those in the cash market. Under the above circumstances, the 
value of information produced by the futures market is confirmed and 
the net: benefits resulting from futures trading substantiated. Many 
authors have fo'und, however, that the futures ratas and the fcr-.vard 
rates are not identical over time. From this, they conclude that 
the futures contract is net criced ccnsistentlv with respect to the cash 
10 
hypotheses tested, these findings would seem to cast doubt on the 
contention that the information produced in the Treasury bill futures 
market is valuable and consistent with similar information produced 
in the cash market. 
Purpose of Srudy 
The purpose of this study is to reevaluate the futures cash 
price structure taking into account various characteristics of the 
markets that have been overlooked by previous authors. For example, 
most of the authors have implicitly assumed that futures contracts 
are economically equivalent to forward contracts end on this basis, 
they have tested for market efficiency by comparing futures rates to 
forward rates. There are, however, important differences which 
distinguish futures contracts from forward contracts. Although a full 
discussion of their characteristics is deferred until Chapter II, the 
differences between the two types of contracts have significant implica­
tions for the analysis of the futures-cash price structure. 
Specifically, this study examines the relationship of prices 
in the futures market to those in the cash market giving explicit 
consideration to all aspects which distinguish futures contracts 
from forward contracts based on cash Treasury bills. These include 
uncertainty. Each cf these considerations is included in a rr.odel of 
the écuilibrium crics cf a futures contract. Several hvootheses 
futures contract is composed of a risk free rate, transactions costs 
and a risk premium. Only the risk adjusted component of the observed 
futures rate is identical to the forward rate implied in the term 
structure. The second hypothesis, which follows from the first, 
states that even in an efficient market, the forward rate will not 
be identical to the observed futures rate if rhe variables which 
distinguish a futures from a forward contract are significant. In­
equality between the rates does not necessarily imply that the two 
markets are inconsistent with respect to one another. 
The theory suggests that tests of efficiency which compare 
the futures rate with the forward rate are inappropriate, as is the 
conclusion that inequality between the two sets of rates implies 
market inefficiency. On the contrary, the implication of the fol­
lowing analysis is that even in an efficient market, the futures 
rate will not be identical to the forward rate. The relationship 
between these two variables is an empirical matter, which will depend 
on the significance of various characteristics which differentiate 
futures contracts from forward contracts. The nature of the bias 
between the futures and forward rates will be explored 
économetricallv on the basis of the transactions costs and a 
risk premium. 
To introduce many of the concepts that are frequently used in 
the forthcoming analysis, Chapter II is dcvcted to providing a full 
description of the markets in which the various contracts are traded. 
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detail along with the major differences between futures contracts and 
forward contracts. Having outlined the institutional details of the 
contracts and their respective markets, the emphasis will then turn 
to previous studies of the Treasury bill futures market. The focus 
of Chapter III, the review of literature, will move from the general 
to the specific, beginning with a comprehensive study of all Treasury 
futures markets and moving on to more detailed studies which 
concentrate solely on the price structure and efficiency of the 90-
day Treasury bill futures market. When the highlights and deficiencies 
of these studies have been explored,, an alternative theory of the 
equilibrium futures price will be developed in Chapter IV. The quali­
tative aspects and implications of this equilibrium price will be 
analyzed, especially with regard to the factors which make futures 
contracts distinct from forward contracts. Following the qualitative 
development of the equilibrium futures price and the relationship 
between the futures rate and the forward rate, the empirical analysis 
of Chapter V will test quanritarively the significance of the be­
havioral relationships developed in the theoretical analysis. The 
empirical findings will include various tables and graphs repre­
senting the observed price relationships over time and the econo­
metric results attempting to explain them. Finally, Chapter VI will 
^ ^ ^ ^ —— —« —• ^ ^ J— ^ O ^ ^  • 
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CHAPTER II. THE MARKETPLACE: SPOT, FUTURES AND FORWARD 
To fully understand analyses of the price structure between the 
Treasury bill futures market and the cash market, it ^s necessary to 
understand the institutional details and basic concepts of the market­
place in which these financial securities are traded. To this end, 
a description of the spot, futures and forward markets for Treasury 
securities is presented, followed by an introduction to the concepts 
of market efficiency and arbitrage. 
mT-, » rri ^ ^ ^ T T ^ i.iic xicrciouxy O-Lxj-
Market 
The Treasury bill cash market constitutes the largest component 
of the U.S. money market. As obligations of the United States 
Treasury, these securities are backed by the full faith and credit 
of the U.S. Government. As such, they are of the highest quality, and 
with maturities of 3, 5 and 12 months and are sold in minimum de­
nominations of $10,000 and multiples of $5,000 above the minimum. 
They are issued in book-entry form, meaning that the purchaser re­
ceives a receipt, rather than an engraved certificate, as evidence 
of ownership. 
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The primary and secondary market 
Treasury bills are traded jn both a primary market and a secondary 
market. The primary market is a regular weekly auction for 91-
and 182-day bills. Each Tuesday, the size of the following week's 
offering of Treasury bills is announced. On the following Monday, 
the 91- and 182-day securities are auctioned and payment and issuance 
occur on the Thursday thereafter. One-year Treasury bills are auctioned 
once each month. The primary market is composed mainly of large banks 
and recognized government security dealers, both of which are per­
mitted to submit tenders at the auction for the accounts of their 
customers as well as their own accounts. Other bidders may submit 
tenders, but for their own accounts only. Tlie primary market is 
basically an "insider" market where the Treasury auctions its weekly 
debt to those institutions who will in turn market and distribute 
the Treasury securities in the secondary market. 
The secondary market for Treasury bills is a dealer-made market in 
which enormous quantities of bills are traded under very competitive 
conditions at very small margins. It is not uncomiTion for rhe daily 
volume of trading in the secondary market to reach as high as $3 
billion to $5 billion. Due to the size of this market and the fact 
that government security dealers are obliged to make a continuous 
market. Treasury bills can be liquidated at any time. 
Treasury bills are priced on a discount basis with the rate of 
return being defined implicitly by the difference between the face 
value and the ourchase orice of the bill. For cxamclc, an investor v.'hc 
15 
bids 98.50 on a 3-month Treasury bill is offering to pay $98.50 per 
$100 of face value on whatever quantity of bills he bids for. In 
this case, the discount is $1.50 over three months and the implicit rate 
of return is approximately 6. 09 percent compounded quarterly. Since the 
secondary market for Treasury bills is a dealer-made market, bills are 
purchased at the dealer's asked price and sold at the dealters bid price. 
This bid-ask spread constitutes the transactions costs of doing business 
in the cash market. It also represents the profit margin received 
by the dealer in return for his role as market-maker. 
The major participants in the Treasury bill secondary market 
include the government security dealers and their retail trade which 
is comprised of banks, thrift institutions, corporations, pension 
funds, and a numerous array of other financial and nonfinancial 
institutions. In conjunction with one another, these market partici­
pants make up what is one of the largest and most competive markets 
J.11 t-HO 
The delivery vehicle on the furures contract 
Treasury bills have certain characteristics that make them dis-inct 
among money market instruments and suitable as the delivery vehicle 
on the Treasury bill futures contract. For example, unlike certifi­
cates of deposit:, commercial paper, bankers' acceptances or even 
Federal agency paper, each issue of Treasury bills is completely 
homogeneous. The -nly difference between 3-month Treasury bills is­
sued in the first week of January.', 1975, and 3-month bills issued in 
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the third week of September, 1979, is their rates of interest. There 
is no variation in the quality of the credit behind the bills. They 
are the most standardized and homogeneous of all money market instru­
ments . 
Another characteristic which sets Treasury bills apart from 
other short-term securities is their high degree of liquidity. They 
are considered to be "near money" and, as a direct obligation of the 
U.S. Government, Treasury bills are among the lowest risk assets of 
all money market securities. Investors of all types, including com-
V/-, -Pi 1 c CT ^  3 C* V TMTJ Ci T"» +- C î ^ . 
corporations and foreign central banks are familiar with Treasury bills 
as an investment vehicle and their low-risk, high-liquidity, 
interest-earning nature makes them an attractive financial se­
curity. 
Due to their unique standing among all money market securities. 
Treasury' bills serve as a general barometer of money market conditions. 
Treasury bill yields are highly correlated with the rates on other 
money market securities and changes in the bill yields are watched 
very closely as an indicator of changes which are likely to occur in 
the whole structure of short-term interest rates. Changes in Treasury 
bill rates receive a great deal of attention in the financial press. 
The distinct characteristics of Treasury bills described above 
make rhem special in more ways than one. They are homogeneous in the 
same sense that hard red winter wheat or No. 2 yellow corn are homogeneous. 
Thev are liauid and fam.iliar to vir-cuallv all monev market 
17 
participants and changes in their prices (yields) are usually indic­
ative of the general movement of all money market instruments. 
These characteristics make Treasury bills the logical choice as 
the delivery vehicle of a futures contract based on short-term 
money. 
The Treasury Bill Futures 
Market 
Traded on organized exchanges, futures contracts are legally 
binding agreements which obligate the seller of the contract to 
deliver the commodity specified in the contract to the buyer at some 
future date at some fixed price. Each futures contract specifies a 
standardized quantity and quality of the commodity underlying the 
contract as well as the location and time of delivery on the contract. 
In other words, all physical aspects of the contract are standardized 
and homogeneous. The only negotiable variable on a futures contract 
is -he price ac which che conrracc is i-radeu. 
Two positions can be taken in a futures market. If a futures 
contract is purchased, the investor is said to bs "long" in the 
futures market. 3y purchasing a futures contract, the holder of 
rhe conuracr is entirled ro accept delivery of the standardized com­
modity specified by the contract at som.e future date at a price 
established when the contract was initiated. On the other hand, a 
futures contract may be sold., and in this case, the investor is 
saia to ûe "snort" in tne futures markeû. When a shore position is 
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taken, the seller may deliver the specified commodity when the 
futures contract matures, at a price that was established when the 
contract was sold. 
With the exception of price, the specifications of a futures 
contract are standardized and both the long and the short positions 
call for the acceptance or delivery of the same commodity bundle. 
Therefore, if an investor were to simultaneously buy and sell two 
identical contracts, his net obligations would be eliminated. How­
ever, if these two transactions were staggered over time, then al­
though tr.e physical obligations of the contract would offset one 
another, the net monetary difference between the two contracts may 
noc. This points out the fact that the only negotiable variable on 
a futures contract is its price and the price of futures contracts 
change over time. 
Specifications of the 90-day Treasury bill futures contract 
Tn0 Tireâsuiry oixx cunujLâcu sù.rrij.j_â.ir tio otLncz 
fixtures contracts in that the tenr;S of the contract are standardized 
with respect to the quantity and quality of the deliverable corrmodity 
and the location and rime of contracc ma-curicy. Specifically, the 
S-mon-ch (13-week) Treasury bill futures contract calls for the 
delivery or acceptance of a 3-month U.S. Treasury bill having a face 
value of $1,000,000 at maturity. Table 2.1 delineates the key specifi­
cations of the Treasury bill futures contracc. At the seller's option, 
a delivezy unir may oe composed of U.S. Treasury bills bearing 
TabLo 2. 1 .  Spocificatiions of 1;lie 90-d£y Treasury bill futures contract' 
ACK COMEX IMM 
DolLvcîiy vcîhiclG 
.Initia] margin^ 
Mai.nt(3nanc:(3 margin 
(per ccaitract) 
I'rico fluctation 
$1 million per value 
of Treasury bills with 
90, 91 or 92 days to 
maturity 
-VOOO 
$600 
Complement oJ' 
discoviiit rate 
$1 million par value 
of Treasury bills witli 
90, 91 or 92 days to 
maturity 
$000 
$600 
Complement, of 
discount iate 
$1 million par value 
of Treasury bills 
with 90, 91 or 92 
days to maturity 
$1,500 
$1,200 
Complement of 
discount rate 
Daily 3imj.ts 
15c live] y monlihs 
(eacli yeaj") 
Date fiisi: traded 
50 basis points 
January, Apr;.l 
July, October 
June 26, 197!) 
60 basis points 
February, May 
August, November 
October 2, 1979 
50 basis points 
March, June 
Septembei:, December 
January 6, 1976 
'.Source; Arak arid McCurdy, Federal Reserve Bank of Now Yorl;, Quarterly Review (Winter 1979/1980). 
'^Maj.cjins vary according to v/liethe:: the contracts cover speculative, hedged, or spread positions. 
'I'lie ma] gins shown aro spéculât j.ve. 
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maturities of 91 or 92 days; however, all bills in a delivery unit 
must bear uniform maturity dates. For all practical purposes, the 
12-;;sck bill that is actually delivered on the futures contract is 
alm.ost always the 91-day bill issued on Thursdays by the U.S. 
Treasury. 
During each calendar year, there are four contract months on 
each of the exchanges that trade Treasury bill futures. On the IMM, 
delivery months occur in March, June, September, and December. ACE 
has delivery months in January, April, July, and October, and Comex 
in February, May. August, and November. Therefore, each month of the 
calendar year is a delivery month on one of the exchanges. On the IMM, 
each contract is currently traded for a period of two years ; there­
fore, there are eight contracts trading at any one time. For example, 
in February, 1980, the following contracts were trading : March, 1980; 
June, 1980; September, 1980; December, 1980; March, 1981; June, 1981; 
Scptcrricr, 19S1; and December. 1981 _ '«'hen wa-r'-n T QAO r-ontract 
expired; a new contract for March. 1981, began trading. Vîhen all of 
the exchanges that trade Treasury futures contracts are considered 
together, an investor has the opportunity to buy or sell a contract 
for any calendar month extending almost two years into the future. 
W'nen a Treasury bill futures contract matures, delivery is made 
on the business day following the last d.vy of trading. This is 
usually the third Thursday of the month. With respect to the IMM, 
nieTiber of z'ne Federal Reserve Svstem. Pavmenc for che securities 
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delivered on the maturing contract is conducted through wire transfer 
of Federal funds. 
The quoracion of concracc prices 
The price of a futures contract is the major decision variable that 
must be considered when evaluating a trade in the futures market. The 
traditional method of quoting futures contracts results in a bid that 
is lower than the offer. However, for trading Treasury bills and other 
discount securities that are quoted on a yield basis, this relation­
ship is reversed because of the inverse relationship between yields 
and prices. In order to make the method of quoting Treasury bill 
futures conform to traditional methods of trading commodities, the 
contract's price is quoted as the difference between 100 and the 
annual discount rate on the bill in question: 
IMM INDEX = [100 - Annual Yield] . (2.1) 
For example, if a futures contract specifies delivery of 91-day 
TrtJdsury bills no yield a lu. ^5 percenr annual return, then rhe price 
quoting the Treasury bill futures contracts preserves tlie traditional 
futures marker relationship in which the long (shore) position profits 
when the contract's price rises (falls). Since the index described 
above is based on an annualized rate, it is not the actual price 
that must be paid for the bill at delivery. The actual price paid 
is computed by using the annual rate of discount in the standard bill 
price formula as follows : 
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Dollar Price {$100 
days to maturity 
360 
X Discount rate x $100]} ( 2 . 2 )  
In Equation 2.2, the discount rate is equal to the dirference between 
ICQ and the settlement price of the futures contract. 
Structure of the Treasury bill futures market 
The structure of a futures market may be divided into several 
categories; the exchanges and clearing houses, the futures commission 
merchants or commission houses, and the market participants or 
retail trade. Treasury bill futures are traded on the IMM in Chicago 
and on the ACE, and Comex in New York. Each of these centralized 
exchanges are headed by boards of directors elected by and from the 
membership and operated through a number of committees appointed by 
the directors. The exchanges are nonprofit organizations and their 
objectives are to: (1) establish equitable business conduct among 
-embers; (2) provif3 an organized market place and establish the 
time of trading; (3) provide -uniform rules and standards for the 
conduct of trading; (4) establish uniformity of contract size and 
trade customs regarding quality and its establishment, time and place 
of delivery, and terms of payment; (5) collect and disseminate market 
information to members and the p'ublic; (5) provide a mechanism for the 
Organized as a separate entity, the clearing corporations play a 
strategic role in reconciling all trades, managing the payment and 
receipt of funds and guaranteeing all futures contracts. By inter­
posing itself between each buyer and seller, the clearing corpora­
tion assumes the opposite side of every transaction- when delivery 
on a maturing contract is made, the long position will pay the invoice 
total to the clearing corporation in return for the delivery vehicle. 
Similarly, the clearing corporation will remit to the short position 
the settlement value of the bills specified by the contract in 
sxchangs for the bills dslivsred on the contract. By this method 
the proper settlement of each contract is carried out without it being 
necessary for each position to be individually matched to an opposite 
position. As a consequence, any sequence of transactions may occur; 
in other words, the investor may initiate a short position before a 
long position or visa versa. 
In addition ro the exchanges and t'^e c" earing corporations, the 
futures commissions merchants stand between the clearing house and the 
retail trade of the futures industry. They solicit and transact futures 
business with the public and carry out orders on the trading floor, or 
instruct others to do so if they are not, themselves, members of the 
clearing corporation. All futures commission merchants must register 
with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the federal 
regulatory agency charged and empowered under the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission Act of 1374 with regulation of futures trading in 
;a; ; not; 
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The final segment of the futures industry is composed of the retail 
trade which consists of numerous customers who buy and sell futures con­
tracts in an effort to achieve their business goals. Many types of 
financial institutions participate in the Treasury bill futures market, 
however, private individuals not acting in a business capacity account 
for the major part of the open positions in this market. Table 2.2 
shows the results of a survey by rhe CFTC of positions outstanding on 
March 30, 1979. The results show that "commercial traders," business 
interests other than the futures industry, accounted for only about 
on the IMM. This is significant because it is the commercial traders 
more than any other group who would most likely use the markets for 
hedging purposes. On the other hand, two-thirds of the open interest 
is controlled by noncommercial traders, i.e., the futures industry, 
commodity pools and individual traders. This group includes those who 
snecnl on inrç7reS"ir l0V6l? ann rnnsç who arbitrage 
differences between the two markets. These results suggest that much 
of the activity on the three-month Treasury bill futures market may be 
speculative and that the markets are not heavily used for their hedging 
potential. 
X. u.i.i'w w A. ci iuciL- ric u 
Futures markets emerge in response to the risks associated with 
V" 1 o * I —\ 1 1 \ ^ 4- ^ ^ ^ /—. /% V ^ ^ i i ^  ^ 1 V~/^ O 
^ ^ .A. V ^ C* ^  ^ ^ ^ ^ V* un W ^ A ^ ^  ^ >w O ^ V. .w «-f 
market. The risk associated with holding an asset or security may be 
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Table 2.2. Participants in the 90-day Treasury bill futures market 
Average open interest; number of contracts^ 
Occupation 
xy / / J 
amount 
1977 as 
percentage 
of total° amount 
1979 as 
of total^ 
Commercial traders 
Securities dealers 2,758 
Commercial banks 326 
Savings and loan 
associations 56 
Mortgage bankers 44 
Orher 1,757 
Total 4,950 
Noncommercial traders 
Futures industry 2,765 
Commodity pools 1,520 
Individual traders 5,858 
Total 10,154 
TOTAL 15.104 
18.3 
2 . 2  
0.4 
0.3 
11.7 
32.8 
18.3 
10.1 
38.S 
67.2 
100.0 
5,595 
1,581 
136 
974 
5,705 
14,992 
8,434 
5,640 
15,586 
29,661 
44,654 
12.5 
3.5 
0.3 
2 . 2  
15.0 
33.6 
18.9 
12.6 
34.9 
66.4 
100 .0 
^Source: Surveys November 30, 1977, March 30, 1979. The 1977 
survey covered all ccsiticnc, but the 1979 survey excluded positions of 
fewer than five contracts. 
^Because of rounding, amounts and percentages may not add to 
totals. 
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divided into business risk and market (or systematic) iisk. witli 
respect to Treasury bills, business risk refers to the risk of default 
on the Treasury bills. This risk is minimal, however, because 
Treasury bills are backed by the U.S. Government. Market risk, on 
the ether hand, is the risk associated with liquidating Treasury 
bills at a loss in the secondary market due to adverse price changes. 
The market risk of holding Treasury bills is positively related to 
the volatility of the yields on these securities. One of the major 
functions of a futures market is the division and transfer of risk. 
A futures market separates the market risk of a commodity from its 
business risk and facilitates the transfer of that market risk from 
these unwilling to accept it to others who desire it. 
The reduction of market risk through the use of futures markets 
is carried out by hedgers in the market. A hedger uses futures 
contracts to manage the market risk exposure associated with the 
ownership of a cash commodity of the commitment to make a mer­
chandising transaction in a commodity at some future date. This defi­
nition suggests that the hedger's principal business occurs in rhe 
cash market commodity and that his primary motivation for using 
futures contracrs is to manage (reduce) the market risk of his cash 
corrmodity. Thus, he is presumably left, with only the business risk 
uw a j_ wj. I f c V d 1 cLii'su. Cil&Ci A ^ ^ Z) ^ j 
his comparative advantage. 
A Treasury bill futures contract can be used to hedge the value 
Whatever the specific strategy, the Treasury bill futures market can 
be used as a hedge against the risk associated with adverse interest 
rate movements. In order for hedgers to reduce market risk, there 
must be someone willing to accept it; hence, the importance of the 
speculator. 
Unlike the hedger who matches a cash market position with a futures 
market position, the speculator takes a position in one market only. 
The speculator in futures markets fulfills several vital economic 
functions which facilitate trading in the underlying cash market 
c <=) /-«n "v 4 +-T 7 1 rsT 7 -v-i clr 4 -nz-r r«"iQ T rav* +-11 vo r-* a 4 -h a 1 f +"l~i O C ja Vo 
of profiting on an accurate forecast of a change in the futures price, 
the speculator provides the very important risk-shifting opportunity 
for the hedger. This suggests that the speculator's comparative 
advantage lies in predicting market price movements (which gives risk 
to market risk) rather than in the merchandising aspects of the 
nnnfa-rlvina cnrnmonirv ('which 1 -ro b'lS i n s i-isksl - Besides Dro— 
vicing for the transference of risk, the presence of many speculative 
buyers and sellers imparts a high degree of liquidity to the futures 
market that allows the hedger to buy and sell in large volume with ease. 
Finally, active speculation in futures markets tends to dampen the 
extremes of price movements that might otherwise occur. 
Although che distinccion between hedging and speculative activity 
in a futures r.arket is not always well-defined, it is apparent that the 
risk-shifting f'unctions of a futures market are made possible by the 
incKractio:! between heccers and speculators. 
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Trading futures contracts 
To buy or sell a Treasury bill contract, a contract order is 
placed with a futures commission merchant who then sends it to the 
trading floor to be executed. For example, suppose that in December 
a commercial bank anticipates an inflow of deposits in six months time, 
June, and expects to invest those funds in 3-month Treasury bills 
maturing in September. Since the bank does not know what the 3-
month Treasury bill rate will be in June when the bills are purchased 
it can hedge its future merchandising commitment by going long in the 
June 90-day Treasury bill futures contract. This is illustrated in 
Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3. Long hedge in 90-day Treasury futures 
Date Cash Market Futures Market 
December Sank plans to purchase 
$10,000,000 of 3-month 
T-bills in June 
Bank buys 10 June contracts 
IMM index: 91.50 
T-bills: $98.00 
'D — _ ...... 
—iCiiiiv ^ i Ada c a V^ x-/ / V-/ 
of 3-month T-bills TP.aturing 
in September 
Price oaid: $93.25 
) 1 c 1 T^nv 
index: 92.5C 
i-OSS : iSlS 
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In the above illustration, the bank had to pay a price 25 basis 
points higher on the bills it bought in June than the December price 
of bills. Thus, the bank had an additional expense of $25,000. 
However, since the bank hedged its future purchase of Treasury bills 
by purchasing ten June futures contracrs, it was able to offset the 
loss incurred in the cash market with an equal gain in the futures 
market. This exposition makes the extreme assumption that the futures 
index moved in a ratio of four to one relative to the cash price. 
and in the same direction. Had the relative price changes been some­
thing other than four to one, or in opposite directions, then the 
gains in the futures market would not have been identical to the 
loss in the cash market. This points out the fact that it is the 
relative price relationship between spot and futures that is important 
in hedging, not the absolute level of prices. 
In a similar situation, had the bank anticipated selling bills 
out of its portfolio rather than purchasing them, then the bank could 
have hedged against a market decline in bill prices by going short 
in the futures market. In either case, the bank would be attempting 
to reduce the market risk associated with adverse price movements by 
hedging its anticipated cash transactions in the futures market. 
Thti hedyiiig exaiTiple described above illustrates several important 
features of futures markets transactions. First of all, the position 
taken in the futures market reverses the sequence of a normal cash 
transaction. If a bank holds an inventory of cash bills which it plans 
to sell in three months, then in the meantime, the bank is said to be 
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long in cash securities. To hedge its inventory, however, the bank 
goes short in the Treasury bill futures market. If cash and futures 
prices move in a parallel direction, then the fact that the bank 
took an opposite position in the futures market to its long cash 
position means that a loss in one market will be at least partially 
offset by a gain in the other market. 
The hedging example illustrated above showed that in June, the bank 
purchased Treasury bills in the cash market and sold contracts to off­
set its futures market obligations. Unlike real assets that may be 
held indefinitely, bill futures contracts expire within a given 
amount of time. The ultimate disposition of a futures contract may 
occur in one of two ways : by offset or by delivery. In the case of 
offset, a long (short) futures position is liquidated by selling 
(buying) an equal number of identical contracts to the initial position. 
This makes the net futures position equal to zero, cancelling all 
contract obligations. On the other hand, contract obligations may be 
satisfied at the contract's maturity date by accepting delivery of 
bills (on a long position) or delivering bills (on a short position) . 
Delivery procedures are fully specified by the various exchanges. For 
example, on the II-M, delivery occurs four times each year when the 
cease trading on the third Wednesday of each contract month and delivery 
occurs on the following Thursday. ^-Jhen bills are delivered on a 
maturing contract, the price paid for them is based on the settlement 
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price of futures contract on its last day of trading. 
Profits or losses on a Treasury bill futures contract occur 
similarly to any other transaction. The gain or loss is simply 
tiie dollar equivalence of the change on the price of the contract 
over time. For example, if a contract were purchased at 93.00 and 
liquidated six months later at 93.85, the dollar gain would be based 
on a price rise equal to .85. It is not necessary, however, to 
purchase a futures contract before selling it. Profits or losses 
can also be made on a short futures position where the futures con­
tract is sold first and repurchased at a later date. In this case 
the gain (loss) is calculated on the difference between the initial 
price at which the contract was sold, and the ending settlement price 
at which the contract was repurchased. 
Costs of futures trading 
The costs of futures trading may be divided into two categories: 
and marginc. Cc—.iccicns cr. fut'Jires assessed 
en a "round turn" basis—that is, the commission covers both entry 
and exit from the futures market. The commission is paid by the 
euscomer to che futures commission merchants when the futures position 
is closed out. All positions, long or short, must pay the commissions 
charges. From the inception of the II>^M's 90-day Treasury bill 
futures contract on January 6, 1976, to March 4, 1978, the date when 
and $60.00 for "overnight" positions. Although commission rates are 
currently negotiable, they are not substantially less than the former 
nonnegotiable rate unless the volume of contracts traded is large. 
In addition to the commission charge, margin money must be 
posted. The "initial margin" serves as a security deposit or 
earnest money guaranteeing the performance on the contract and mu-^t 
be posted by both long and short positions at the initiation of their 
contracts- Members cf the clearing house must post a margin of $1,200 
per contract, which can be in the form of cash or bank letter or 
credit. The clearing member firm must, in turn, impose an initial 
margin requirement of at least $1,500 on its customers. This may be 
posted in the form of cash, selected Treasury securities, or in some 
cases, letters of credit. The initial margin, which is posted when 
the futures contract is opened, may be interpreted as the investor's 
equity position in the futures market. If the investor is long 
(short; in futures contracts and the price of those contracts rises 
(fails), then the equity position is enhanced and profits in the 
margin account may be witndrawn immediately. On the other hand, 
in the event of adverse price movements, i.e.- a fall (rise) in 
contract prices, the margin account will be impaired. when losses 
occur and reduce the firm's margin below a specified level call the 
"maintenance margin," the firm must replenish its margin account to 
its original level. 
Maintenance margin is usually set at 75 percent of the initial 
margin; in the Treasury bill futures market, the maintenance margin 
is currently $1,200 per contract, at a minimum. The purpose of 
specifying a maintenance margin is to ensure the financial integrity 
of the clearing house by protecting the contract holder against large 
accumulated losses. If the investor is long (short) in futures and 
the price of his contracts falls (rises) to such an extent that the 
value of his margin balance decreases to less than the maintenance 
margin level of $1,200, he will be advised to restore his margin 
account back to the original level of $1,500, the initial margin. 
These "margin calls" must be made in cash to the brokerage firm be­
fore the commencement of trading on the next business day. 
The daily resettlement procedure of crediting or debiting the 
margin balance according to the daily price movements of the futures 
contract is called "marking-to-market." For as long as the futures 
position is outstanding, the contract will be marked-to-market by the 
clearing house at the end of each business day. 
To illustrate the mechanics of the margin account, suppose that a 
bank plans to purchase $1,000,000 v.'crth of 3-month Treasury bills in 
September, six months from now. Suppose also that the current 
price of the futures contract maturing in September implies a yield 
on izs delivery vehicle th^t the bci;:k li-uS quite satisfactory. 
Therefore, the bank plans to purchase one Septem±>er Treasury bill 
futures contract and accept delivery on the contract. This is illus­
trated in Tables 2.4 and 2.5, along with an exposition of the margin 
account. For the sake of simolicitv, it will be assumed that the 
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Table 2.4. Futures market long hedge and exposition of margin account 
when contract price rises 
Margin Account Futures Transactions 
March 1 
Deposit $1,500 initial margin with 
futures commission merchant. 
June 15 
J. , Duu _Lii_L I—LCiJ_ iucij-yjLii 
250 margin profits withdrawn 
$1,500 total margin 
SepteiTiber 23 
(delivery date) 
$1,500 initial margin 
500 margin profits withdrawn 
$1,500 total margin 
March 1 
Buy one December 90-day Treasury 
bill futures contract. 
Contract price: 92.00 
June 15 
Contract's price rises to 
92.10 
September 23 
( de 1ive ry date) 
Final contract settlement 
price: 92.20 
—— — — — — —• ^ ^ ^ V» ys "T* TV\/^ T>C* n V\ 1 ^ ^ 1 11 L.d 1 CLl i V C 11 LCI ^  ^ O O ^  L. CI W «L» ^ w ^ A ^  
margin. Therefore, each basis point change in the price of the 
contract will trigger either a margin call, if the price declines, 
or the withdrawal of margin profits, if the futures price moves 
1 
higher.~ 
In the example illustrated in Table 2.4, the bank goes long in the 
On a Treasury bill futures contract worth $1,000,000 of face 
value, each basis point change in the price of the contract is worth 
$25.00 (.0001 (90/360) 1,000,000). Thus, if the initial margin is 
$1,500 and the maintenance margin is SI,500 as well, then for each 
basis poin-c decline (rise) on a long (short) futures posicion, the 
contract holder will be required to post a ^-^argin call of S25. 
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futures market on March 1 by depositing $1,500 in initial margin with 
its futures commission merchant. By June 15, it is shown that the 
contract price has risen by 10 basis points yielding a margin account 
profit of ?250. Continuing to rise ujitil the time of delivery, the 
final settlement price of the contract is 92.20, a 20 basis point 
rise since the original purchase price of the contract. Thus, with 
respect to the margin balance, the bank has made a total profit of 
$500 over six months. 
Accepting delivery of cash bills on the contract, the bank pays 
to the clearing house an amount corresponding to the final settlement 
price of the futures contract, 92.20. This being 20 basis points 
above the price of the contract when it was purchased, the bank 
incurs an added cost of $500 in the price it must pay for the cash 
bills. However, since the margin account shows a $500 profit over 
the six month holding period, the effective price on the cash bills 
is still 92.00. Having taken delivery on its contract, the bank has 
fulfilled its contract obligations and therefore, the initial margin 
(performance bond) that was paid to the brokerage firm is returned 
to the bank. 
The analysis of Table 2.5 is similar to the above except in this 
ir.i:'cd.nct;, miy cuiicrdcc y , Llie iTiargin balance was iiti 
paired and the bank was required to make margin calls to replenish 
the value of its account. However, in Lliis case, the $500 loss sus­
tained in the margin acco'ont was offset by a contract settlement price 
that was lower than contract orice at which the bank entered the 
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Table 2.5. Futures market long hedge and exposition of margin account 
when contract price falls 
Margin Account Futures Transactions 
March 1 
Deposit $1,500 initial margin with 
futures commission merchant 
June 15 
$1,250 initial margin 
250 margin calls 
$1,500 total margin 
March 1 
Buy one December 30-day Treasury 
bill futures contract 
Contract price: 92.00 
June 15 
Contract's price falls 
to 91.90 
September 23 
(delivery date) 
$1,000 initial margin 
500 margin calls 
$1,500 rotal margin 
September 23 
(delivery date) 
Finax contract settj.emenc 
orice: 91.80 
futures market. Again, as in the first case, the effective price is 
92.00 and again, since all contract obligations were met by accepting 
delivery, the initial margin money is returned to the bank. 
The Forward 
Market 
Forward transactions are common in many areas of economic 
aczivi-cy, including the money market. In a forward transaction a 
seller agrees to deliver goods to a buyer at some fut^^e date at some 
fixed price. For example, a bank may forward contract to sell 
Federal funds a few days hence based on a price specified today. 
The forward contract is a tailor-made agreement designed to suit 
the individual needs of the agreeing parties. Specified in the contract 
are the terms of the agreement which include the price, quantity, 
quality, time and place of delivery, and the terms of payment. 
Since each forward contract is unique with respect to the terms 
listed above, the forward contract market is thin and heterogeneous. 
Thus, forward contracts are not traded on an exchange but in an in­
formal, decentralized market. For this reason, forward contracts 
are not guaranteed in any way except by the faith and credit of the 
agreeing parties. 
Futures vs. forward 
Forward contracts for deferred performance and exchange of 
title have characteristics which are both similar and dissirailax Lo 
specifies the price, quality, time of delivery, etc. of the underlying 
commodity, however, this is where the similarities end. 
Unlike forward contracts that are heterogeneous in character, 
futures contracts are standardized agreem.ents which are identical 
and homogeneous wirh respect to all terms except the month of delivery 
and the price. For this reason, futures contracts are traded on 
formalized exchanges governed by derailed rules which are enforced 
bv a professional sraff of the exchange. Since furures conrracts 
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have the backing of the clearing house, the performance on the contracts 
is guaranteed by the exchange. Forward contracts, on the other hand, 
have no guarantee other than the pledge made by the agreeing parties. 
As a consequence, the futures market has more depth and liquidity 
than the forward market. 
Another consequence of futures trading on an organized and 
centralized exchange is the fact that, unlike the forward contract, 
the futures contract is a negotiable instrument. To liquidate an 
open contract in the futures market simply involves taking an off­
setting position; however, in the forward market, this is not 
generally possible since forward contracts are tailor-made, non-
negotiable agreements. 
This suggests another distinction between forward and futures 
contracts. Forward contracts are usually made with the full intention 
to accept delivery on the contract, with title being transferred. 
Futures contracts, on the other hand, are usually offset prior to 
their maturity with no title ever being exchanged. 
A final distinction between futures and for-v-ard contracts that 
is significant for later analysis is the way in which profits or 
losses are m.ade. In the futures market, profits or losses are 
acc'araulateà zn the margin acco-unr over -he holding period 
cf the open contract. This daily resettlement process is not 
present in the forward market since the forward market requires no 
margin account. All profits or losses in the forward market are 
incurred at the time deliverv is made on the forward contract. 
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Thus, with respect to profits or losses, a major distinction between 
the futures and the forward markets is the timing over which they are 
realized. 
Market Efficiency and 
Arbitrage 
Two concepts that will be pervasive throughout the analysis are 
the concepts of market efficiency and arbitrage. For this reason, 
they are introduced in the present context because they apply to both 
the futures market and the cash market. 
Market efficiency 
An efficient market is one in which current market prices reflect 
all available and relevant information. As new information becomes 
available, it is immediately incorporated into the market resulting 
in changes in market prices. For example, suppose that new information 
acquired by traders causes them to anticipate that the futures price 
of a contract, FP_^, will rise in the next period, t+1, to F?_^,^. 
present discounted value is greater than the current price of the 
contract, i.e., FP^ < FP^ ,, / (l-i-r ) , where r is the appropriate rate of 
± 1. Cue _L:icv ynj: 
the contract at F?^ and sell it at a later date for a price equal to 
FP^,,. In the aggregate, competition would ensure that the current 
futures price would be bid up to a point where no profit would be 
made by purchasing the contract in the current period and selling it 
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in a future period, that is, to the point where (l-^r) . 
Similarly, if the present discounted value of the futures contract in 
period t+1 were less than the current price of the futures contract, 
FP^ > FP^.^/(l+r), traders would sell the futures contract, unrii the 
current price of the contract and the present discounted value were 
equal, FP^ = FP^_^^/(1+r) . 
The efficient market hypothesis states that all currently avail­
able and relevant information about current and future events is 
reflected in current market prices. Thus, as new information about 
future events becomes available, expectations of future prices will 
change, causing changes in current prices. If new information comes 
to the market in the form of a random series of events, and if market 
prices change quickly according to revised expectations, then it 
follows that the resulting time series of prices will themselves 
exhibit a random process. Thus, a time series of price changes in an 
efficient market should exhibit a random walk and conform to the 
assumptions of the classical linear model concerning zhe errut vari­
ance. Specifically, econometric results of a regression of current 
prices on previous period prices should show tlia'c in an efficient 
marker, zhe vector of residuals (the first differences in prices) 
Annuld be independently distributed with no evidence of serial 
correlation. Accordingly, one major proposition of the efficient 
market hypothesis states that the best estimate of next period's 
price is the current period's price. 
Algebraically, the efficient market hypothesis may be expressed 
/11 
as the following Martingale sequence.^ 
^ S'=t+l' 
= the price in period t+1, 
= the price in period t, 
r^ ^^  = the discount rate in period t+1, 
® = the information set available at time t, 
e^_^^ = the residual error term in period t+1, and 
E = the expectations operator. 
By lagging all of the variables by one period, the efficient 
market hypothesis may alternatively be represented by the second-
order Martingale sequence: 
where, in accordance with the assumptions of the classical linear model, 
2 
t. ^ ^ f *-"1 
an nxn identity matrix and i 0. 
One implication of the efficient market hypothesis is that a 
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fere, much of the empirical analysis of this hypothesis has been con­
cerned with testing for serial covariances of the observed price 
series (or returns). These tests have been based on various assump­
tions concerning the inforrr.ation set 0_. Weak form tests assume that 
'For a good s'uirmary of the efficient market model, see Eugene F. 
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the information set consists of past prices (or returns) only, semi-
strong form tests concern the speed of price adjustment to currently 
publicly available information (announcements of annuel reports, 
monetary policy, etc.) and finally, strong form tests are con­
cerned with the possibility that certain investor groups have monopol­
istic information relevant to price formation and the effect of this 
insider information on the determination of prices. 
In this study, the concept of efficiency is applied to the inter­
relationship between the cash and futures market for 90-day Treasury 
bills. Efficiency, in the present case, implies rhat prices in the 
cash and futures market are structured in such a way that arbitrage 
between rhe two markets is not possible. One of the implications of 
efficiency under these circumstances is that the two markets will 
exhibit a direct ano well-structured price relationship with the 
result that any aberration occurring in one market would be trans­
mitted to the other market. %ether this in fact occurs depends on 
the degree of market efficiency, or alternatively, the existence or 
TiOu Ot c-lTDlt-ZT&yc . 
nTZ)Z uZ'cly c 
in terms of rhe absence of arbitrage opportunities. Strictly defined 
arbitrage means buying something where it is cheap and selling it whe 
4 -!- 4 c y av 1 % a I/- m 7 4 -t-n o —ma vV +-
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net difference between the lending and borrowing rates. The profit 
is calculated ex ante with certainty and locked in by the arbitrage 
operation. 
Arbitrage between the Treasury bill cash and futures market may 
take the form of either "pure arbitrage" or "quasi arbitrage." Pure 
arbitrage refers to shorting securities not owned and using the pro­
ceeds to fund an equivalent position in other securities at a lower 
price. In rerms of the Treasury bill cash and futures market, this 
essentially means shorting Treasury bills in the cash market to 
fu_nd an equivalent position using cash market securities and futures 
contracts. In this case, arbitrage profits are made without having 
to own tne securities outright. Quasi arbitrage, on the other hand, 
refers to selling securities from an existing portfolio in order to 
finance an economically equivalent position composed of both Treasury 
cash securities and Treasury futures contracts. 
Although both forms of arbitrage exhibit the basic concept of 
buying cheap and selling dear, the transactions costs incurred in 
each type of arbitrage are not the same. In the case of pure 
arbitrage, the securities that are shorted must somehow be financed. 
îiJhether they are borrowed or obtained on a reverse repurchase agree­
ment, the coscs of financing the short position must be considered 
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with the execution of the futures and cash positions. These include 
commissions and margins in the futures market and the bid-ask spread 
in the spot market. 
The exposition of the arbitrage criterion of efficiency is a 
direct result of the development of the theory of the equilibrium 
price of a futures contract. If the structure of prices in the 
futures and spot market for Treasury bills is in equilibrium, neither 
pure arbitrage nor quasi arbitrage opportunities will be available 
between the two markets. If, on the other hand, the price structure 
is not in equilibrium, then continuous attempts to engage in 
arbitrage will stimulate a dynamic process which will encourage market 
efficiency. 
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CHAPTER III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Futures trading in Treasury securities represents an innovative 
application of the traditional concepts of hedging and speculation. 
These concepts, as well as the benefits and costs associated with 
futures trading, have been thoroughly studied for the agricultural 
commodities over a long period of time by a wide variety of authors ; 
Boyle (1920), Hoffman (1932), Blau (1944-45), Talssr (1955-55), 
Gray (1950), Kieronymus (1971), Working (1948, 1949, 1953a,b, 
1952 and 1970), Johnson (1957, 1950), Peck (1975), Stein (1951) and 
Ward (1971). Such is not the case, however, with the Treasury 
futures markets which are very new and still unfamiliar to many people, 
including potential users of the markets. Very few in-depth studies 
have been conducted, and the "hows" and the "whys" of market use as 
well as the costs and benefits of trading Treasury futures are still 
in the exploration stage. 
General Analysis 
The one notable exception to the otherwise dearth of compre­
hensive studies is a report conducted by the U.S. Treasury and the 
Commission on May 14,. 1979. The Treasury/Federal Reserve Study of 
Treasury Futures Markets (1979a..b) consists of two volumes wnicn 
attempt to identify the major questions of social concern regarding 
the Treasury futures markets. Its analytical approach to the questions 
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posed ultimately leads to a summary ejid conclusion regarding the po­
tential benefits and problems of trading in Treasury futures. The 
study concerns itself with the 90-day Treasury bill futures as well 
as the one-year bill futures Treasury note and Treasury bond futures 
contracts. To date, the Treasury/Federal Reserve study is the only 
comprehensive analysis of the Treasury futures markets which attempts 
to analyze the broad social questions that arise with respect to 
trading in Treasury securities. For this reason,- the study is examined 
for its value in delineating the general outline of the Treasury 
futures markets, and for exposing the major issues of social concern 
within its periphery. 
The study was conducted in order to advise the CFTC of the 
Treasury's and the Federal Reserve's positions and recommendations 
regarding existing contracts and proposals for new ones. The report 
begins by outlining the major questions that the Treasury and Federal 
Reserve feel are the issues of social concern. The first issue con­
cerns the effect that futures trading in Treasury contracts will have 
cn th^ underlying cash market for government securities. Before the 
Treasury and Federal Reserve can endorse the initiation of new contracts, 
they want to be sure that futures trading in U.S. Government securities 
does ncz adversely effect thv tjiriclency or integrity of the underlying 
cash marker for these securities. 
Specifically, the two agencies are concerned that speculation in 
the futures market may be destabilizing with the result that arbitrage 
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between the two markets will transmit these destabilizing influences 
to the cash market. Their fear rests on two basic assumptions, 
neither of which, however, is fully analyzed in the study. The first 
is that speculation has a destabilizing effect on prices rather 
than a stabilizing one, and the second is that there is a structural 
link between prices in the two markets that exists due to arbitrage 
between the markets. Although the study does recognize the possibility 
that the first assumption may not be valid, it does not examine the 
nature of the price structure between the two markets. This, how­
ever, is essential in order to assess the effects that changing futures 
prices have on the cash market. 
The second issue raised in the report is related to the first 
except that it concerns the effect that futures trading has on the 
Treasury's ability to manage the Nation's debt. Specifically, the 
study asks wheLliex trading in futures contracts which depend on 
deliverable supplies of Government cccurities is likely to consLraiu 
the Treasury in its debt management decisions. With respect to the 
90-day Treasury bill contract, the Treasury is worried that because 
there is only one issue deliverable on the maturing contract, it is 
possible that at the time of delivery, the total amount of bills 
specified by open long contracts may exceed the total supply of bills 
deliverable on -che conrracc and that in this event, the cash market 
for 90-day bills would be seriously disrupted. This situation may 
occur as the result of market par-icipanrs cornering the market. 
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influences on the cash market by increasing the supply of deliverable 
bills at its weekly auction, the Treasury's primary goal is the 
efficient management of the Nation's debt, and it should not feel 
constrained to satisfy the circumstantial needs of participants in 
the futures market. 
Given that futures trading has the potential for causing prob­
lems in the cash market for government securities, the third issue 
raised by the Treasury/Federal Reserve study is that of surveillance. 
The report questions the ability of the CFTC to maintain effective 
surveillance of the financial futures markets, particularly given 
difficult delivery situations and also as essentially duplicative 
contracts are traded simultaneously on several exchanges. The body 
of rules on most exchanges usually include emergency powers which 
can be enacted in times of trading disruptions. Furthermore, the 
CFTC is empowered by the Commodity Exchange Act of 1974 to ensure that 
the exchanges enforce their own rules, and direct an exchange to take 
any action needed to maintain orderly markets whenever it believes 
an "emergency" such as market manipulation exists. The Treasury/ 
Federal Reserve report is concerned, however, that the CFTC may not 
be as diligent or as strong as it should be to oversee th^se r.arkets. 
J.:r:=?u«r i. cia. uiic 
unsophisticated investors will not fully appreciate the risks inherent 
in futures contracts whose names (erroneously) suggest the backing of 
the U.S. Treasury. Participation in the Treasury futures marker in­
volves highly leveraged positions of futures contracts and large 
49 
profits or losses can be made very quickly. Although the contracts 
are guaranteed by the exchanges on which they trade, they do not in 
any way have the backing of the U.S. Treasury. The Treasury and 
Federal Reserve System are concerned with the adverse effect on 
public welfare that may result when unwary investors enter the futures 
market without a full appreciation of the risk and dangers involved 
in trading futures contracts. 
Having outlined the above issues, the Treasury/Federal Reserve 
report goes on to explicate the potential benefits and problems 
resulting from trading futures contracts in Treasury securities. 
According to the report, the two primary benefits are: 1) the 
potential for the reallocation of risk from financial institutions 
desiring to avoid it to those willing to accept it, and 2) the aggre­
gation and dissemination of information regarding the market's expec­
tation of what future interest rates will be. This information is 
disseminated through the price system of futures contracts. 
Potential problems arising from futures trading in Treasury 
securities include the sair.e kind of issues that were outlined above. 
The destabilizing effect that futures speculation may have on the 
spot market, the potential disruption from market corners or squeezes 
sLZ'.c. uLidi uT uppluT uêlivei'sble securities are 
among the potential problems which, according to the Treasury and 
Federal Reserve, may have the effect of lowering the public's 
welfare. 
In addition to outlining the potential benefits and problems from 
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futures trading in Treasury securities, the Treasury/Federal Reserve 
study also lists various conclusions and recommendations to the CFTC. 
With respect to the problem of the adequacy of deliverable supplies, 
the Treasury and Federal Reserve advocate a "market basket" approach 
to the question of the appropriate contract delivery vehicle. Rather 
than having a single Treasury issue be the sole delivery instru­
ment, as is the case in the 90-day Treasury bill futures contract, 
the Treasury advocates the use of a contract which specifies delivery 
of any one of several Treasury issues (i.e., from a market basket), as 
with the Treasury bond contracts. This would effectively increase 
the deliverable supply of the contract security, thereby preventing 
problems due to inadequate supplies of deliverable issues. As a 
consequence, this would, in turn, reduce a potential source of dis­
ruptive effects on the cash market. With respect to the 90-day bill 
contract, the Treasury/Federal Reserve study of Treasury Futures Markets 
states that (p. 23): 
Because the 3-month bill contract has become so well established 
and so actively used in its present form., a redefinition of 
deliverable supply at this j^'oncture seems unwarranted .... 
However, in view of the concerns expressed by market partici­
pants that the 3-month contract has been vulnerable to squeezes 
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these possibilities through improved data collection and 
monitoring of interactions between the futures and cash 
A second recommendation made to the CFTC concerns the potential 
risks associated with contract proliferation. The Treasury and Federal 
Reserve System have urged the CFTC to proceed slowly in authorizing new 
ccncraczs. On specific issues, the CFTC has been urged to approve only 
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those contracts which specify a market basket of delivery instruments 
and contracts which are not duplicative of ones already in existence. 
Finally, the report recommends that safeguards for the protection 
of investors be instituted within the futures industry. These would 
include procedures for the surveillance of small dealer firms and 
the dissemination of information to alert the public of the risks 
of having a highly levered position. In addition to these, the report 
recommends that the exchanges establish customer suitability standards 
and other measures such as higher margin requirements and position 
limits to ensure investor protection. 
The report issue by the Treasury and Federal Reserve System is 
intended to be a comprehensive summary of the major issues regarding 
trading in Treasury futures. It defines the boundaries of the field 
and the nature of the game, but not all of tiie intricacies of the 
rules. Many of these are assumed away. For example, it is apparent 
tiiat the Treasury is alarmed by the potential effect that aberrations 
in the futures market (destabilizing speculation, market squeezes) may 
have on the spot market. And, it assumes that futures markets effects 
are transferred to the spot market via arbitrage. However, the report 
does not investigate the question of arbitrage or the price structure 
that exists between the futures and the cash markets. If a well-
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exist, then the Treasury's fears have a more solid foundation. In any 
case, it is essential to analyze and evaluate the formal structural 
price relationship between the futures and the cash markets. 
Specific Studies 
The futures-cash price relationship has been studied recently 
by a number of economists, each of whom has attempted to empirically 
evaluate the futures market using theories of the tenri structure and 
other hypotheses for determining the equilibrium value of a futures 
contract. 
Poole Study 
Poole (1978) analyzed the link between the futures and cash 
markets by constructing an arbitrage model using the nearby futures 
contract for 90-day Treasury bills and the 3- and 5-month cash bills. 
The model develops the condition for the equilibriuiTi futures price 
by proposing an arbitrage siruarion between -cht; futures. mdikcL cmd ulr 
cash market where cash prices are treated as predetermined. The -onde 
lying hypo thesis of the model is that yields on alternative invest­
ments which have identical holding periods should be -che same. 
Ignoring transactions cosrs, Poole contends that a strategy consistin 
cf cash market securities only will give rise to a forward rate which 
will be identical to the rate on a futures contract. Expanding the 
model CO include the fixed costs of commissions and initial margin, h 
then develops an equilibrium range of futures prices oetween which 
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arbitrage is not possible. 
His empirical analysis is conducted by plotting the theoretical 
upper and lower critical yields of this arbitrage range on a daily 
basis for nearby contracts for the period from January 5, 1975, to 
June 23, 1977. Superimposed over the range of theoretical values are 
the observed yields on futures contracts. Poole concludes that al­
though there is a tendency for the observed futures rates to fall 
closer to the lower than the upper arbitrage points, as well as a 
tendency for all rates to fall in the final contract month, it is 
apparent that profitable arbitrage opportunities rarely exist for 
the nearby contract and are small when they do exist. These results 
imply that during the three months prior to the contract's maturity, 
the only period of time when perfect arbitrage may be obtained, the 
futures contract is priced efficiently. 
Poole's study was one of the first to analyze the equilibrium 
futures price. The study was limited, however, in its scope. Only 
the nearby contract was analyzed and various costs associated with 
the margin account were not included. Thus, the conclusions based 
on his study should not be regarded as general conclusions pertaining 
to all contracts over their entire trading period. 
Emery and Scott Study 
In an analysis which is similar to Poole's, Emery and Scott 
(1979) attempt to provide an indirect test of the pure expectations 
hypotnesis of che rerm structure of interest rates. In their analysis, 
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they implicitly assume that a forward contract is identical to a 
futures contract. Thus, they set out to prove that if the yields 
on futures contracts are similar to those on the corresponding forward 
contracts, then it can be concluded that the value of the forward 
rate as determined by the pure expectations hypothesis is, indeed, an 
unbiased estimate of expected rates, that is, the futures rates. Of 
course, they are assuming that the futures rates are unbiased expec­
tations of futures spot rates. This may not be true; in any case, it 
is an empirical question. 
Using weekly spot rates to calculate forward rates and ignoring 
all transaction costs, Emerv and Scott plotted a time series of for­
ward rates against observed futures rates. Although they applied no 
formal test of the significance of the difference between the two 
measures of the expected yields, they nevertheless conclude that 
"the two types of estimates seem to lie well within a range such as 
to encourage rejection of the null hypothesis that a significant 
difference exists." Their eye-ball observations apparently give them 
enough confidence to conclude that the rates observed on the futures 
contracts are merely a second observation of the same market expec­
tations implied by the current tern structure of interest rates. 
In fact, they go even furtlier to conclude tiiat even for securities 
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if futures trading were established in that market. 
assumption that futures rates are unbiased expectations of future 
spot rates is not supported in their work and their conclusions have 
no foundation upon statistical testing procedures. Therefore, their 
off-hand conclusion that observed futures rates substantiate the 
expectations hypothesis of the term structure must be regarded with 
caution. 
Lang and Rasche Study 
Lang and Rasche (1978) also provide a similar analysis to that 
of Poole's; however, they arrive at very different conclusions. 
The conceptual approach is essentially the same as Poole's in that 
they postulate that the yields on 3-month bill futures are identical 
to the forward rates for comparable periods.- but their empirical 
analysis is far more extensive. Rather than constraining themselves 
to an analysis of the nearby contract only, they compare the forward 
and futures rates over the full life of contracts extending two 
years in-co che ru-cure. Since Treasury bills have a macuricy of one 
V. Cij-v-i j-Civ-OO uw ctj. J-Ui C O wxiw CiW u-o i-aaCaw lliCi J-IX 
year or more. In addition, rhey encounter the problem thai: rhe 
maturities on many of the cash securities do not properly match the 
relevant dates on the futures contracts. Thus,- they are forced to 
approximate their calculations, by interpolating (mismatched) forv.'ar 
C2.J.-L —vc d L_ i-j-iud v.,/j. w G.J_ u-iiciu 
conicaraoie -co -cne races on futures conrraczs. 
56 
The comparison of the forward and futures rates is conducted on a 
bond equivalent basis for three separate periods from March 1, 1976, 
to March 31, 1978. For each period, the absolute and arithmetic mean 
of the difference between the futures and forward rates are calcu­
lated for each of eight successive contracts, from the nearby to the 
most distant. The analysis is conducted across contracts and over 
time in order to determine whether contract maturity or time trends 
have any effect on the relationship between the futures and fori'/ard 
rates. Based on their tests of the significance of the absolute 
difference between the futures and the forward rates, Lang and Rasche 
come to the conclusion that the forward and futures rates are not 
equal, contrary to Poole's conclusion. By analyzing the arithmetic 
difference over time, they further conclude that the difference be­
tween the two rates has not narrowed over time as one might suspect 
they would as the market matures. In particular, the two researchers 
find that for the first two contracts nearest to delivery, the 
observed points that fall outside of the no-arbitrage range usually 
fall below it whereas for the later-dated contracts, the observed 
rates outside of the arbitrage range almost always are above it. 
Lang and Rasche refute the findings of Poole and find that 
tor contracts near tc their maturity, %he futures rste is biased 
ccvjnward relative to the forward rate and rhat rhis situation is re­
versed as the time to rhe contract's maturity is increased. In at­
tempting to explain this bias, they point out that the default risk 
of an implied for^-'ard contract (which is constructed using U.S. Treasury 
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bills) is different from that on a futures contract. Whereas the 
Government's backing of U.S. Treasury bills makes them default free, 
futures contracts which are only guaranteed by the exchanges on which 
they trade are not. Therefore, they suggest that investors in 
futures contracts may require a risk premium for the more distant 
contracts with the consequence that the futures rate will be biased 
upward relative to the forward rate. 
Although Lang and Rasche extended Poole's analysis by analyzing 
the entire (two year) trading life of each contract considered, they 
ccnrinued to neglect certain differences between futures contracts 
and forward contracts which may be significant for the analysis of the 
futures and forward rates. Futures exchanges require daily resettle­
ment of margin accounts; forward transactions do not. This fact 
introduces an element of uncertainty into futures trading which is 
not captured in the above analysis. 
Puglzsi. Study 
Xn â stZuCy 5ii5.-LyzLnc !iri.v£3"cut£n"c sxciri'LLn: 
the case of quasi arbitrage and compares "cl'ie holding period returns of 
alternative strategies. The first involves purchasing a bill and 
holding it to maturity and the second consists of the tandem position 
of a second cash bill (91 days greater maturity than the first bill) 
and a short futures position which has a common maturity date with the 
— "'v-oi- 1 1 1 
Puglisi ignores all transactions costs in his empirical analysis 
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which uses daily settlement prices on nearby futures contracts and 
(dealer-ask) prices on cash Treasury bills. Using t-statistics for 
testing for the significance of the difference between returns on the 
bills-only strategy versus bills-futures strategy, Puglisi concludes 
chat the difference is significantly greater than zero. Based on 
his empirical results, he concludes that the futures market for 90-
day Treasury bills is inefficient. Trying to explain the bias between 
the two rates of return, Puglisi suggests that institutional constraints 
which prevent entry of institutions which could arbitrage the market 
may be one reason that the market inefficiencies continue to exist. 
This further suggests, he contends, that institutional investors who 
are free to use the markets can increase the returns on their port­
folios by developing strategies that involve bills-futures as well 
as bills-only. 
Fuglisi's approach suffers the common error of ignoring certain 
variables that may be significant for the analysis. These include 
the fixed costs of commissions and initial margin and the variable 
cosTis that are associated with the margin account. 
V-LoKolci and Dale Study 
In a comment to Fuglisi's analysis, Vigncla and Dale (1979a) take 
issue with the manner in which his results are reported. Vigncla and 
Dale calculate the same rates of returns for the strategies as pro­
posed by Puglisi; however, they extend the analysis to the first three 
conzrac^ maruricies racher than just the nearby contract. They find 
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that although their numerical results differ from those obtained by 
Puglisi, they concur with his conclusion that the futures market is 
inefficient. Their major concern, however, is in the method of testing 
and reporting the results. Puglisi reported summary statistics which 
included, among other things, the mean difference between the returns 
on alternative strategies for various futures contracts and the 
standard deviation of those returns. Vignola and Dale contend, how­
ever, that the distribution of the difference in returns from bills-
only and bills-futures strategies must be examined on a daily basis 
in the form of a daily time series. To this end, they provide 
diagrams of daily time series of the bills-futures returns minus 
bills-only returns for each contract. The diagrams showed that 
summary statistics which average the difference can be (and are) mis­
leading especially if the difference in returns reverses its sign 
over the period of analysis. The results also indicate that there 
is significant auto-correlation in the arbitrage returns for °ach 
contract, confirming that the futures market is inefficient, not only 
in an arbitrage sense but also in the sense that arbitrage returns 
are not distributed randomly over time. Although their major con­
clusions are similar to Puglisi's, Vignola and Dale point out that 
investors buy and sell on individual days, not at the mean return and 
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vignola and Dale's point that investment returns should be 
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This is apparent from observation of the empirical results. However, 
their study suffers similar shortcomings as Puglisi's due to the 
fact that the two methodologies are essentially the same. 
Capozza and Cornell Study 
Capozza and Cornell (1979) examine the case of pure and quasi 
arbitrage and set out to test the familiar hypothesis that the futures 
rate on a contract should be equal to the forward rate corresponding 
to that contract. Like Puglisi, and Vignola and Dale, Copozza and 
Cornell exclude transactions cost in their model in any explicit way, 
although they do qualitatively recognize their impact on the dif­
ferential between futures and forward rates. To simplify the exposi­
tion of their arbitrage condition, continuously compounded rates of 
return are used rather than the Treasury bill discounts normally 
quoted in the financial press. Thus, their foirward rates are derived 
by caking the natural log of the prices of adjacent Treasury bills 
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Tests of the arbitrage condition were based on tlie differences 
between the futures and fcrv:ard rates using weekly data. The data 
were lirr.ited to the first three futures contracts, since beyond that 
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calculate forward rates with the result that they would not have been 
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eluded the average deviation and the average absolute deviation between 
%he futures rate and the forward rate. The averages were computed by 
61 
taking the first three futures contracts, subtracting the relevant 
forward rate from the futures rate, and averaging the difference 
over the thirteen weeks in each quarter of the sample period, 
March, 1976, to June, 1978. Also reported in the results are 
tables and graphs which show the relationship between the deviation and 
the maturity of the futures contract. The results clearly show that 
the futures rate is biased downward relative to the forward rate for 
the nearby contract, but as the time to maturity of the contract 
increases, the futures rate becomes biased upwards relative to the 
fon-jard rate. Capozza and Cornell attribute the existence of this 
differential to two institutional constraints: (1) the costs 
associated with shorting securities in the cash market, and (2) the 
reluctance of institutions to enter the futures market. 
Like the previous authors, Capozza and Cornell fail to in­
corporate in their analysis all of the variables that are likely to 
influence the futures rate relative to the fonvard rate. They ignore 
the fact that a futures contract is not economically equivalent to a 
fork'ard contract and the implication of this difference. 
Rendleman and Carabini Study 
Rendleman and Carariini (1979) develop a model to test for the 
efficiency of the Treasury bill futures market. The equilibrium 
price of a futures contract is determined on the basis of arbitrage 
relaticnsnips between the futures contract and the spot bills. The 
model is then expressed in the form of the IMX Index and transactions 
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costs are considered explicitly. These give rise to a range of 
equilibrium IMM Index values within which arbitrage is not possible. 
To test for efficiency, Rendleman and Carabini examine the re­
lationship between observed IMM Index values and the theoretical 
values. They use daily data and the analysis is limited to the first 
three contracts for similar reasons as those cited by Capozza and 
Cornell. In the first stage of the analysis, the actual IMM Index 
values are compared to their theoretical counterparts assuming no 
transactions costs. They find that there are generally positive 
price differences for the nearby contract a_nd negative differences 
for longer term contracts. (Notice that this is consistent with 
Capozza and Cornell's findings since prices and yields are inversely 
related.) Rendleman and Carabini annualize the spread differentials 
to make them comparable over time, because, as they point out, arbitrage 
profits in the short-term contracts can be earned in a shorter period 
of time than those in the long-term contracts. 
In the second stage of their analysis, the researchers account 
explicitly for the costs associated with commissions and initial 
margins, and under these conditions, only one-third of the observa­
tions offer arbitrage opportunities. Rendleman and Carabini conclude 
that there exist quasi-arbitrage possibilities in zhe short-cerm 
contracts but that they do not appear to be large enough to offer 
attractive investment alternatives to the short-term portfolio 
manager. 
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costs of commissions and initial margin. In doing so, they conclude 
that differences that appear to offer arbitrage opportunities are 
not significant when the above costs are considered. Their analysis 
points out the importance of including all variables that affect the 
futures and forward rates. 
Vignola and Dale Study 
Taking a fresh approach to the question of the equilibrium price, 
Vignola and Dale (1979b) compare the actual futures price with two 
alternative specifications of the equilibrium futures price. Based on 
Working's (1949) theory of carrying charges, the first specification 
of the equilibrium futures price is an overnight cost-of-carry model 
where the equilibrium futures price equals the spot price of the 
cash bill deliverable on the contract plus the cost of storing that 
bill. The cost of storage is equal to the financing cost necessary 
to store the bill until the maturity data on the futures contract, 
•mis, in cum, is equal to tue xctue uu a icverse repurchase agreement. 
In the second specification, Vignola and Dale resort to the 
familiar approach of comparing the actual price of the futures contract 
no rhe price of a forward contracc constructed on the basis of cash 
Treasury bills. Using the mean of the bid-ask spread, and the federal 
fi-Lnds rate as a proxy for the repurchase rate, they calculate two 
daily time series of differences; a series between the actual futures 
price and the equilibrium ccst-of-carr-/ futures price and the other 
berween futures and forward prices. 
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Based on their analysis of the annualized differences between 
the actual futures prices and the two alternative specifications, 
Vignola and Dale conclude that the cost-of-carry model is more 
appropriate for the analysis of pure arbitrage because it embodies 
the concept of the opportunity cost of funds in the repurchase rate. 
On the other hand, they contend that the forward rate model is 
appropriate for analysis of quasi arbitrage since the forward rate 
may be obtained from a combination of cash bills held in an existing 
portfolio. 
This study is ijnique in its cost-of-carry model.- an approach 
which deserves further study. The forward rate model, however, ignores 
the margin account of the futures transactions and possible influence 
it may have on the relationship between the futures and forward 
rates. 
Morgan Studies 
In two separate articles, Morgan iiy/y, xysu; poinrs our -cha- one 
of the major differences between forward and futures contracts is the 
insurance role provided by the clearing house as a result of its re­
quirement that clearing members resettle their acco^unts each day 
through the process of marking to market. Recognizing the contribu­
tions of Black (1976) in the pricing of commodity contracts, Morgan 
contends that due to marking to market, futures prices will not equal 
for-.-.'ard prices even in an efficient market. Specifically,- he shows 
that while the change in the value of a futures contract is equal 
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to the change in the contract's price, the change in the value 
of a forward contract is equal to the discounted change in the for­
ward price. Under the assumption that the forward and futures 
contracts are equivalent with respect to all other characteristics, 
the change in the value of each of the contracts would be the same. 
If futures and forward prices are equal at the beginning of a period, 
the above condition implies that the two sets of prices must be 
different at the end of tlie period if value changes during the period 
are to be equal. Morgan concludes his analysis by stating that the 
difference between futures and forward prices arise because futures 
prices incorporate expectations regarding the course of interest rates 
between the initiation and delivery dates of the contract whereas forward 
prices do not. 
Morgan's studies are the first to recognize the differences be­
tween futures contracts and forward contracts. The process of marking 
tc market the daily price changes of futures contracts has signifi­
cance for the analysis of futures and forward rate because, as he 
poir.rs our, interest may be earned (foregone) on the cash withdrawals 
(margin calls) from the margin account. The expectation of interest 
earned (foregone) must be considered in any ex-ante calculation of 
arbitrage returns. 
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Arak and McCurdy Study 
In addition to providing a general description of the Treasury 
bill futures market, Arak and McCurdy (1980) investigate tax implica­
tions on futures prices and how taxes might affect the spread between 
futures and forward prices. They point out that there are two tax 
factors that provide the incentive to use the markets to reduce tax 
liabilities. The first is the fact that the 1RS assumes that a gain 
or loss on a futures contract is realized only when the futures con­
tract is closed out (not over time in the daily resettlement process) 
and the second is that the 1RS treats a gain or loss on a long futures 
position that is closed out more than six months after it is initiated 
as a long-term capital gain or loss. On the other hand, any gain or 
loss on a short futures position is considered a short-term capital 
gain or loss no matter how long the position remains open. Arak and 
McCurdy postulate that investors would prefer to have price apprecia­
te on treated as a long-term capital gain rather than ordinary income. 
Given this, some who might normally purchase, say, 52-week bills would 
have the incentive to buy distant futures contracts instead and, as 
they matured, sell them off to take their capital gains, and invest 
their funds in 3-month bills. This kind of activity would reduce 
the demand for 52-week bills thereby raising rheir discount rates, 
increase the demand for distant futures, decreasing their rates, and 
the net effect would ^esulc in a downward bias of tlie discount rates 
Oii .L u. u c: a wo .LC-L-dt-u. vc -i. Ci. w** 
D11 J.S . 
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The study by AraJc and McCurdy, although it does not specifically 
address the question of market efficiency or the price relationship 
between the futures and the cash market, does introduce the tax vari­
able as a significant motivation for certain behavioral patterns and 
observed relationships. The significance of this variable with 
respect to the price structure between the futures and cash markets 
needs to be studied further. 
Summary and critique of studies 
In one way or another, each of the articles reviewed above at­
tempts to analyze the relationship between futures and cash prices 
(rates). This does not imply th?t each has the same objective; 
whereas, Emery and Scott are concerned with testing for the validity 
of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure, Rendleman and 
Carabini use sim.ilar procedures to test for the efficiency of the 
Treasury futures market. Despite some variety in their objectives, 
most of tne papers are essentially concerned wiLh ulic îïvç<,Liicâià 
rhar the futures rate on a contract is equal to the for---ard rats im­
plied in the cash cenri structure of interest rates. For the most 
part, it is the construction of the arbitrage model and treatment 
of transactions costs, compounding periods, annualization periods, 
contract maturities, and rate approximation formulas which dis­
tinguish one methodology from the next. For example, Poole's analysis 
was based on an arbitrage model of the equilibrium futures rate 
including commissions and initial margins costs, whereas Vignola and 
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Dale analyzed the actual futures price abstracting from explicit 
consideration of transactions costs. 
Despite the conflicting evidence cited by the various re­
searchers, in general, the futures rates are found to be biased 
downward relative to the forward rate for the nearby contracts and 
biased upward for the more distant contracts. Even when the methodology 
is similar, the studies differ with respect to their conclusions. For 
example, the studies by: (1) Poole, and Lang and Raschs, and (2) 
Puglisi, and Vignola and Dale exhibit completely different con­
clusions, although they are quite similar in structure. 
Witli the exception of Morgan, each of the authors (Lang and 
Rasche. Puglisi, Vignola and Dale, Copozza and Cornell, and Rendle-
man and Carabini) whose empirical analysis indicated statistically 
significant differences between the futures and the forward rates, 
conclude that the Treasury bill futures market is inefficient. Various 
reasons are cited to explazr the futures-forward bias including the 
risk of a futures contract compared to a forward contract, the new­
ness of the market and the lack of use by institutional investors. 
However, the major reason cited by nearly all of the authors to explain 
the bias is the existence of fixed transactions costs, i.e., commissions 
and initial margins. Ai-chough zhe sxiszence cf these Lions 
costs dees seem to prevent pure arbitrage.- it does not fully explain 
why quasi arbitrage profits continue to exist.- nor does it explain 
the observed pattern of the bias between futures and forward rates. 
Perhaps this suggests that not all of the relevant variables have been 
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adequately accounted for. 
The conflicting evidence regarding the efficiency of the Treasury 
bill futures market and the observed bias between the actual and 
equilibrium or theoretical futures price tends to suggest that a 
number of issues concerning model specification remain unresolved. 
In fact, as Morgan points out, it is not entirely clear that even 
in an efficient market, the futures rate should equal the for-ward 
rate. 
A major difference between the futures and forward contracts is 
the daily resettlement process of marking to market. Although futures 
and forward contracts may be similar in other respects, the inter­
temporal distinction in the way in which profits or losses are in­
curred may account for some of the difference in prices between the 
two kinds of contracts. Specifically, since profit withdrawals or 
margin calls on a futures contract depend on the time series of futures 
prices during the open contract, the equilibrium price of a futures 
contract may be influenced by investor expectations of futures prices 
over rime. Since by their very nature, expectations are uncertain, 
the equilibrium futures price may also embody a risk premium in 
compensation for the risk encountered in the margin account. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE STRUCTURE OF PRICES AND YIELDS 
BETWEEN THE FUTURES MARKET AND 
CASH i'i^ ruvET 
To alleviate some of the shortcomings of existing models, a 
specification of the equilibrium futures price is developed which 
recognizes all of the variables that are relevant ro trading futures 
and forward contracts. These include commissions, initial margins 
and risk premiums. The relationship between observed futures rates 
and forward rates is explored on the basis of these variables. 
No Transactions Costs 
The time dimension of a 90-day Treasury bill futures contract is 
represented in Figure 4.1. An investor, by going long or short on a 
Treasury bill futures contract, may contract at time 0 to buy or sell 
Treasury bills. Although the commitment price of the bills is set at 
time 0, the bills are not delivered or accepted until the maturity 
date of the futures contract, time m. Ar rime m, delivery or accep­
tance of the Treasury bills is executed, and 91 days thereafter, 
at time n, the bills mature. In accordance with Figure 4.1, 
let ? and ? ecual the time G market prices "er $100 of par value 
m n * 
cf spot market Treasury bills with maturity dates at time m and 
r., respectively. Based on disccjnt rates and a 360 year, the prices 
of the spot bills, ?__ and , may be expressed as: 
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91 days 
0 
m n 
Current Date Maturity Date Maturity Date 
of the of t.he 
Futures Contract Delivery Vehicle 
Figure 4.1. Time dimension of a Treasury bill futures 
contract 
and 
where r and r are the discount rates on the soot market Treasury 
m n * 
bills which mature at time m and n, respectively. In addition, let 
FP represent the time 0 market price of a futures contract per $100 
of par value at maturity, time m. 
Suppose that at time 0, an n-day bill can be purchased (or sold) 
at a price At time n, this bill will have a maturity value of 
$100 and the dollar return from holding such a bill will be equal to: 
= (100-?^) ^ (4.2a) 
:t. Alternatively, suppose that instead of purchasing 
:he n-day bill and holding it to maturity, a simultaneous purchase 
consisting of the m-day bill and a futures contract is executed. In 
fnis tandem transaction,, the m-day bill is purchased at time 0 and it 
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matures at time m. At time m, the maturity value of- this bill is used 
to fund the settlement of the futures position, the price, FP, which 
was established at time 0. If FP is less than $100, the maturity 
value of the m-day bill, then it is necessary to purchase only a 
FP 
fractional amount, (Jqq") • of the m-day bill in order to fund the futures 
position at time m. Since the Treasury bills accepted on the futures 
contract have a time n maturity value of $100, the total dollar 
return, R^, from the tandem purchase of the m-day bill and the futures 
contract will be: 
M.2b) 
In this example, the holding period, 0-n, is the same regardless of 
which investment alternative is chosen—the purchase of the n-day 
bill or the simultaneous purchase of the m-day bill and the futures 
contract. If investors are indifferent to all characteristics other 
than the holding period yield of the alternatives available to 
them, competitive market forces will ensure parity between the holding 
period returns of the two alternative investments, that is: 
3^ = 3%. (4.2c) 
Similarly, consider the holding period O-m. Within this period, 
the investor can purchase either the m-dav bill at F and hold it to 
m 
maturity or he can simultaneously purchase the n-day and sell a 
futures contract with the intent of delivering the n-day bill against 
uiic ru'cuifés con'CifâC'Cf ô.u 'Cxrûé rn. Tûé 0—rci nOj-diLno oenod rêcurn or "cne 
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simultaneous purchase of the n-day Treasury bill and sale of the 
futures contract will equal; 
= (FP - P ). (4.3a) 
Because the m-day bill will yield $100 at its maturity, only a frac-
Fp 
tional amount, , of that bill need be purchased in order for it 
to yield FP at its maturity, making the maturity value comparable to 
the first alternative. Therefore, the holding period return of the 
m-day bill is expressed as: 
= [FP - (4.3b) 
As with the 0-n holding period, market forces will ensure parity be­
tween the returns of each alternative with a O-m holding period; 
therefore, 
R; = R; . (4.3c) 
In the absence of transactions costs, market forces in either holding 
period, O-m or 0-n, will ensure that R = or R^ = R^. From Equa­
tions 4.2c and 4.3c, it can be demonstrated that equilibrium will be 
obtained only when : 
FP 
or 
m^lOO^ ' n 
= 100(? /? ) 
n m 
:quation 4.4b defines the equilibrium price, FP* , of the futures 
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contract in terms of the time 0 spot market prices of the m- and n-
day bills. if the observed futures price is equivalent to the 
theoretical futures price as described above, risk-free arbitrage 
opportunities will not be available. 
The equilibrium futures price, FP*, is illustrated in Figure 
4.2. The vertical axis represents the price of the futures contract 
and the horizontal axis represents time. In relation to Figure 4.1, 
time m, the maturity date of the futures contract, is represented in 
Figure 4.2 by the intersection of the horizontal and vertical axes. 
Points to the right of this intersection indicate the price of an 
open futures contract, that is, at a point in time prior to the 
contract's maturity. Thus, the line drawn in Figure 4.2 portrays a 
time series of equilibrium futures prices. 
Suppose, however, that the existing time 0 futures price were 
represented by point A. Because point A is below the equilibrium 
futures price., there would exist an incentive to take advantage of 
arbitrage profits by exchanging the n-day bill for the equivalent 
position of an m-day bill and long futures contracts. The latter 
position would yield a higher rate of return than the holding period 
of the n-day bill. 
To illustrate this kind of arbitrage, suppose that the time 0 
yi—L uiiC vw cliiva ^ Ov^ V a u wci.c cms-t. 
respectively. These prices would imply discount rates of 10 percent 
— V-V>11 T  O  -«-s C )  ^  ^  ^ /-V -v- ^  1 ^  
^ W ^  V -k ^ ^ C<^ Sw- ^ ^  ^ A t V» ^ ^ S..* ^ J" -k. WI* 
FP 
111 J 
Maturity date 
0^"' tlie futures 
contract 
i  4 . ; - ! .  I : ; < | U  i  1  i  l : - ) ' i  u r n  f u t u n ^ s  p r i c . - o  c u r v e  
FP*=100(~) 
Pni 
Time 
(Prior to maturity 
date of the futures 
contract) 
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Equation 4.4b, the equilibrium futures price would be 98.46, implying 
a discount rate of 5 percent. Under these circumstances, the same 
holding period return would be earned over 180 days regardless of 
the investment chosen. If the 180-day spot bill were purchased and 
held to maturity, the holding period yield would be 8 percent. If, 
on the other hand, a simultaneous purchase consisting of the 90-day 
bill and a futures contract were executed, the average return over 
180 days would also be 8 percent. Suppose, however, that the futures 
price were 98.35, below the equilibrium futures price. This would 
over 180 days, when combined with the purchase of the 90-day bill. 
This would be a higher rate of return than the 8 percent that could 
be earned by purchasing the 180-day bill and holding it to maturity. 
Similarly, an observed futures price represented by point B would 
create an incentive to substitute for the m-day bill a tandem posi-
4- n /-V >-> O .r» f T» v-\ Vn-i 1 1 ? v* T» C" v--f- f CT /^/~\ 4-V a A 1 1 /Tn 
the holding period, 0-m, remains the same, the returns from arbitraging 
the market by taking a short futures position are positive. Thus, it 
is clear that points A and 3 represent disequilibrium prices, thereby 
indicating the existence of profitable arbitrage opportunities. 
Points below the equilibrium level of futures prices provide the 
incentive ro be long in the Treasury bill futures marker while prices 
above the equilibrium level signal a short futures position. Having 
characterized efficiency in the Treasury bill futures market by a lack 
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off of the equilibrium line in Figure 4.2 must be regarded as observed 
prices in an inefficient market. 
Transaction costs 
The relationship expressed in Equation 4.4b is altered when 
transactions costs are considered in the analysis. Indeed, when 
transactions costs are included, profitable arbitrage may not exist 
even though the observed futures price does not equal the theoretical 
futures price, FP*. 
The cost of arbitrage between the cash and futures market for 
Treasury bills may be divided into two categories ; those incurred in 
trie spot market and those incurred in the futures market. If pure 
arbitrage is undertaken, spot market costs consist of: a) the costs 
of financing a short position in the spot market, and b) the trans­
actions costs associated with buying or selling Treasury bills in the 
spot market. Quasi arbitrage, on the other hand, involves only the 
transcations costs associated v;itn ûuying and selling from an existlny 
portfolio, that is, the bid-ask spread. 
Futures market costs consist of the commission charges, the 
initial margin, and any variation margin (margin calls) . wi-ch the in­
clusion of transactions costs in the analysis. Equation 4.4b will be 
altered such that there will be a range, rather than a single value, 
of equilibrium futures prices where arbitrage is not profitable. 
Following Poole's (197S) lead in the analysis of the arbitrage 
range, the lower and upper future's prices of that range are developed. 
78 
The exposition of the arbitrage range is developed in terms of quasi 
arbitrage. Therefore, to determine the lower futures price of the 
arbitrage range, suppose that the n-day spot bill is owned. If the 
price of a futures contract is low enough, it will pay the investor to 
substitute a portion of the n-day bill already owned with an equiva­
lent investment consisting of a purchase of a m-day bill and a 
futures contract. The holding period of each of these alternatives 
is 0-n and the maturity value of each is $100. Therefore, if the 
price of the futures contract is lev: enough tbrt less than 100 per­
cent of the n-day bill r.ust be sold in order to fund the simul­
taneous purchase of the m-day bill and the futures contract, the re­
maining fraction of the n-day bill still owned would constitute an 
arbitrage profit. This assumes, of course, a hold-to-maturity strategy 
where the returns on the alternatives must be compared over a similar 
holding period. 
The n-day bill may be sold at the dealer's bid price: 
^ , n * ^ ^ ^ K r- \ 
= luu -
The m-day bill must be purchased at the dealer's ask price,-
= 100 - r"(%#:r)100. (4.5b) 
The bid yield on rhe n-day bill, r^, and the ask yield on a m-day 
a 
bill, r , are annualized discount rates and are based on a 360 
m 
day year. The bid-ask spread represents the transactions costs of 
doing business in rhe spot market. Enough m-day bills must be 
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purchased so that their maturity value will be sufficient to fund the 
settlement on the futures contract when it matures at time m. The 
price of a futures contract, FP, established at time 0 is: 
FP = 100 - r"{^)100, (4.6) 
where r^ is the annualized Treasury bill discount yield on the Treasury 
bills specified by the futures contract. 
Fixed Transactions 
Costs 
In addition to the price of the futures contract, other associated 
costs must be considered; commissions and margin requirements. 
Commissions 
The normal commissions charge on a round turn futures transaction 
is $60.00 per contract. This is usually paid when the contract is 
liauidated, either by offset or delivery. Although commission charges 
are now negotiable, the flat fee usually remains at $60.00, unless 
the number of contracts traded is very large. The commission charge 
is also assessed on a basis which abstracts from the holding period 
of the open contract. In other words, with the exception of day 
trades, the commission is the same regardless of the holding period 
of the ocen contract. 
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Initial margin In addition to the commission charge, margin 
money must be posted by both long- and short-position traders. The 
amount of initial margin required to be posted has changed over time 
and is dependent on the type of position taken in the futures market. 
Generally, the initial margin has equaled $1500 per contract. 
The fixed costs of trading futures contracts must be taken into 
account in any ex ante calculation of arbitrage profits. Letting c 
equal the commission charge per $100 of futures contracts and d equal 
the initial margin on a like basis, the total cost of settling the 
long futures position at time m is: 
(FP + c - d). (4.7a) 
This expression shows explicitly that at time m, the purchase price, FP, 
and the contract commission, c, must be paid in order to settle the 
long position. The initial margin, d, however, is returned to the in­
vestor when the contract obligations are fulfilled unless, of course, 
there is a net debit to be accounted for as a result of margin calls 
not yet met. In order to fund the futures position, enough rr.-day 
bills must be purchased at orice to crovide (FP + c - d) at their 
in 
maturity. Therefore, the total amount of cash needed at time 0 to 
'9 ^ c + a , (4.7b) 
100 
wnere it is snown explicitly that tne initial margin, c, is paie at time 
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0 when the futures contract is purchased and returned to the investor, 
at time m, when it is closed out. 
At time n, the Treasury bills which are accepted on the futures 
contract will have a maturity value of $100. Therefore, over the 
holding period, 0-n, the total dollar return from the simultaneous 
purchase of the m-day spot bills and the futures contract will be : 
FP 4- c — d a 
R, = 100 - ^ )P f d], (4.8) 
A 100 m 
Because none of the variables in Equation 4.8 is random at the time 
U.1 iC 0.0. c&y C _L. a XC .k C f / _i_ O JVX r* xx *1 ^  L.XX O a- wCx-kxx wj; / 
and no risk is involved. If, on the other hand, the n-day bill is 
held in the portfolio until maturity at time n, the return will be: 
= (100 - ?^). (4.9) 
Setting Equations 4.8 and 4.9 equal to one another yields essentially 
-king g amçi ^SS'U—'^S 2.S S0Ô. Dy KcUlS.'ti.On 
The total cash requirement at time 0, represented by Equation 
4.7b, is raised by selling a fraction, 2, of the n-day bill already 
O'/med. If that fraction is less than 100 percent, the remaining 
fraction, 1-Z, of the n-day bill still owned will represent an 
arbitrage profit. In other words, Z less than unity implies the 
existence of profitable arbitrage opporcuniries, and according co our 
previous definition, an inefficient market. If the ex ante calculatior 
of arbitrage returns requires that Z is less thari unity, then the 
total return R_. from the arbitraae ooeration will be: 
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"t = \ = flioo - \oo" " '^1 
+ [(1-Z) (100-P^)]} . (4.10) 
To raise the funds to purchase enough m-day bills that upon 
maturity will have a value sufficient to fund the futures position, 
ZP" must be sold. If ZP~ = ")P" + d, then [ ] is 
n n 100 m ^b 
n 
the fraction of n-day bills which must be sold. Arbitrage will be 
profitable only if that fraction is less than unity. Therefore, 
in terms of futures prices, arbitrage will be undertaken only if: 
"lOo" + d < P° (4.11a) 
PP < 100 (^) - - a. (4.11b) 
m 
J. L.1 iC C C V C Vt J u _1. a j. \_/«nr «c- a_ 
hand sice of the inequality, quasi arbitrage will be profitable. 
Given the well-known fact that yields and prices of marketable 
interest bearing securities are inversely related, -the above relation-
Equations 4.5a, 4.5b, and 4.5 in Equation 4.11b, the arbitrage rela­
tion can be expressed as follows: 
^ - îôô^m'êï' " locTn/gï' " ïôô'l^T^' _ 
> . 
ri _ 1 
-n'360'' 
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Equation 4.12 is an expression of the upper arbitrage limit in terms 
of the discount rate per $100 of futures contracts. If the yield on 
the futures contract, r^, is higher than the term on the right hand 
side of the inequality, quasi arbitrage profits may be obtained by 
selling a fraction of the n-day bill from the existing portfolio 
and simultaneously purchasing the m-day spot bill and a futures con­
tract. The costs of conducting the above transactions are shown 
explicitly in Equation 4.12. The bid-ask spread of the spot market 
transactions is represented by the bid-ask yields and the futures 
market commission and margin requirements are reflected by the terms 
and 
100 m 91 ' 100 m 91 100 91 
In a similar fashion to the foregoing development, the upper 
(lower) arbitrage price (yield) may be obtained. If the futures price 
(yield) is high (low) enough, it will be profitable to substitute the 
n-day bill and a short futures position for a portion of the m-day 
bill held in the portfolio. In this case, the holding period is 
0-m, not 0-n, as before. If the fraction of the m-day bill sold to 
finance rhe purchase of the n-day bill and the short futures position 
is less than unity, the remaining fraction of the m-day bill left in 
the portfolio after all of the arbitrage transactions have been com­
pleted represents a quasi arbitrage profit. Tne upper arbitrage price 
+ ïôôfm - îôôfm + 
m 
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If the observed futures price is above the expression on the right 
hand side of the inequality, quasi arbitrage profits will be avail­
able by selling the m-day spot bill while simultaneously purchasing 
the n-day spot bill and going short in the futures market. 
By substituting Equations 4.5a, 4.5b, and 4.6 into Equation 4.13, 
the lower arbitrage limit in terms of the discount rate can be 
expressed as; 
(JL) _ / (JL) + _E_rb(_5L) _ 
f . ^ n/91^ m/sl/ 100 m ^91 100 m ^91/ 100 91 
r < • (4.14) 
- "m'A" 
If the observed yield on a futures contract that matures at time m 
is lower than the expression on the right hand side of the inequality, 
quasi arbitrage is possible by selling a fraction of the m-day bill 
and substituting it with enough n-day bills to satisfy delivery on 
a short futures position. 
Combining Equation 4.11b and 4.13 defines the no-arbitrage range 
of futures prices: 
ITi lu 
Likewise, from Equations 4.12 and 4.14, the no-arbitrage range of the 
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< y. 
[1 - r^/^)] 
, - r^C^Y) - + I3ôFm(#l) + ï§ô(I^R)] . 
< . (4.16) 
[1  -  :m(3ëF)] '  
Having defined efficiency in terms of the potential for arbitrage 
between the futures and the spot market for 90-day Treasury bills. 
Equations 4.15 and 4.16 show the theoretical range of prices and yields 
of futures contracts in an efficient market. If the observed futures 
price flucLuaces beyond the arbitrage limits developed above, the 
investor with a portfolio of m- and n-day Treasury bills can improve 
the rate of return on his portfolio by altering the composition of 
his spot market securities and going short on long in the futures 
marekt. Thus, an inefficient market presents an attractive means for 
specified risk exposure. 
The existence of transactions costs give rise to a range of 
futures prices (yields; for which arbitrage opportunities are net 
available. This range of futures prices is illustrated in Figure 
4.3. where, as in Figure 4.2, futures prices are measured along the 
vertical axis and time is represented bv the horizontal axis. The 
(positive excess siupply) 
m 
Maturity date 
of the futures 
contract 
J' 
(positive excess demand) 
— Time 
(Prior to maturity 
date of the futures 
contract) 
CD 
m 
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not available. For example, consider point A. If there were no 
fixed costs associated with futures trading, point A would represent 
a disequilibrium situation which could be profitably arbitrage# by 
going long in the futures market. In the absence of transactions 
costs, the arbitrage profits in this case would be a function of the 
spread between the observed futures price, point A, and the equilibrium 
futures price, FP*. However, the fact that the futures price repre­
sented by point A is within the no-arbitrage range indicates that the 
fixed costs of trading futures outweigh the potential gain due to 
the observed spread. A similar conclusion would hold for point B 
where normally (abstracting from transactions costs) the existence of 
potential arbitrage profits would dictate a short futures position. 
Poole's analysis considers only the fixed costs of futures trading. 
Therefore, in Figure 4.3, the spread of the arbitrage band surrounding 
the equilibrium futures price is defined solely by the costs associated 
with commissions and initial margin. 
To extend Poole's analysis, variable costs are introduced and 
their effect on arbitrage and the equilibrium futures price is 
analyzed. The variable cost of futures trading is associated with 
the process of marking to market, which is the daily resettlement pro­
cedure occurring in tht; margin account. 
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Variation margins 
To protect the investor against accumulated losses and to ensure 
the performance of the contract obligations, the IMM specifies a 
level called the "maintenance margin" or "variation margin", below 
which the initial margin is not permitted to float. As described in 
Chapter II, a balance is calculated by debiting or crediting the 
daily price movements of a contract to the initial margin. If price 
movements are favorable to the contract holder, then surplus funds 
of the margin balance can be withdrawn. If, however, they are un­
favorable, margin calls must be met. Everyday, the IMM debits or 
credits the balance of a clearing member's account by the dollar 
change in the value of his open contracts resulting from the price 
movements occurring in the previous trading session. 
Assuming price movements, the total amount of cash which 
must be made in margin calls (or withdrawn) is a function of the 
difference between the settlement price at the time of contract 
liquidation or delivery and the price at which the futures position 
was opened. Letting V represent the variation margin, the total gain 
or loss per contract to the margin account may be expressed as: 
V = [FP^ - F?](k), (4.17) 
where F?_ is the contracts ending settlement price, F? is the price 
at which the futures position was opened and k is the dollar equiva­
lent of each basis point change in the contract's price, i.e., $25.00. 
Thus, 'oniike the fixed costs of commission or initial iriargin, the cost 
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or gain associated with variation margin is a function of the change 
in futures prices over time and the number of contracts held. 
Because FP^ is not observable at the time the contract is initia­
ted; the investor must estimate what he believes will be the settle­
ment price of the contract upon delivery. It has been assumed 
throughout the preceeding analysis that the arbitrage strategies call 
for the satisfaction of long or short futures contracts by actual 
delivery or acceptance. Thus, the investor who decides to arbitrage 
is assured that upon completion of his contract obligations, both 
4 - 4  V »  i  + -  4  a  1  m a  v r r  it-» +-K c Tra ma vrrn r» TaTOii 1 >-o+-n r*n 
him. This would seem to make the necessity of estimating the con­
tract's settlement price at maturity a moot point. However, margin 
calls must be made in cash, and though the variation margin is 
effectively returned to the investor at the contract's maturity, 
the interest earned or foregone on that money is not. Therefore, 
the will anticipate an interest loss or return of: 
e 
Vr = - F?j vk.) (;c) ^ 
where F?_, a random variable signified by the tilde, is the antic-
ipated settlement price of the futures contract and r is the pre­
vailing rate of interest or opportunity cost of shorr-term f-unds. 
Vr, also a random variable, is the anticipated interest cost (return) 
on the margin account over the life of the contract and is incurred 
V CO. i.; ; u.;: u-l . uw ^ a. i—o ct\-. v-• 
con Cl." dC C - V i. 5 Lie on une o u' u. 
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prices over time and short term interest rates. 
Various implications follow from the consideration of the margin 
account. First, the cost (gain) associated with the variation margin 
cannot be estimated with certainty if the time series of futures 
prices and interest rates is not certain. If an investor is long 
in futures and the price of his contracts rises (falls), then there 
will be an interest gain (loss) on the margin money withdrawn (posted) 
on his account. Expectations of the time series of futures prices 
will determine the anticipated interest cost or gain on the margin 
account. Since ex ante calculations of arbitrage profits niust account 
for all costs, fixed as well as variable, the uncertain variable cost 
(return) associated with the variation margin means that, strictly 
speaking, arbitrage involving the futures market is not totally risk-
free. In so far as Equation 4.8 is concerned, this suggests that R 
is in fact a random variable, not a certain return. As a result, in­
vestors or arbitragers may demand that a rick premium be included 
into the futures return in order to compensate for the risk incurred 
in the margin account. 
A second implication results from the effect that competitive 
market forces will have on disequilibrium futures prices over time 
and the behavioral expectations generated from changing prices. 
Consider point C in Figure 4.3. If the futures price ac rime J" is 
below the range of equilibrium futures prices, as point C is, then 
quasi arbitrate profits may be obrained by selling the n-day bill 
11 and acme lonc in -ne 
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futures market. Therefore, point C represents a disequilibrium 
price that will encourage positive excess demand for long futures 
contracts. The excess demand will tend to drive the futures price 
upwards, towards its equilibrium level. Thus, the investor who goes 
long in futures contracts at point C will anticipate a rise in the 
price of his contract over the holding period. Assuming his expec­
tations materialize, the investor's equity position in the margin 
account will be enhanced, entitling him to withdraw cash from his 
margin balance. The cash profits may then be invested to earn a 
positive rate of return at prevailing interest rates. Point C,- then, 
represents a disequilibrium futures price that will stimulate an 
excess demand for long futures and the anticipation of a net interest 
gain on the margin account. 
Similarly, if the observed futures price were at point D in 
Figure 4.3, arbitrage would dictate going short in the futures market. 
Tn this cdbe. ai'i excess supply of short futures contracts would de­
press contract prices over time. A short futures position coupled 
with falling prices would also show a net gain on the margin acco'ont 
upon which interest could be earned. Therefore, competitive market 
forces at point D as well as point C would stimulate favorable price 
movements for the contract holder with the result that his margin 
account would be enhanced. 
This analysis suggests that each investor who arbitrages the 
futures market would anticipate receiving a positive interest return 
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on his margin account over the holding period. In other words, competi-
~e 
tive market forces give rise to behavioral expectations such that Vr 
is positive. A distinction must be made, however, between the be­
havioral expectations of individual investors and mathematical 
expectations of the market place. 
An investor's behavioral expectation concerning Vr depends upon 
his personal forecast of the ending settlement price of his futures 
contract, FP^. Investors who arbitrage the market will expect Vr 
to be positive. In the mathematical sense, however, the expected 
- — ^  ^ ^ ^ 7^ T T A T ^ /—» ^  J— ^ -w» "» ^ ^  /-N £ <^11 ^ O ** 1 A W X. V J. wu..x.a. L-LiC iUC O.A* w X. V 
values for Vr. From Equation 4.18, it is evident that the random 
variable Vr is a function of the random variable FÏ> . Thus, the ex-
m 
pected value of Vr will depend upon the mathematical expectation of 
F?^. From Chapter II, it will be recalled that a major proposition 
of the efficient market hypothesis states that the mathematical expec-
f y-\£i -v- *1 'o 4 c 4-/-\ ^ M A r^"r*"ioo T"n ?-n ^  
current period. By iteration, it logically follows that in any 
period, the expected price n periods in the future will also equal 
the currently observed price. Thus, in terms of the efficient market 
hypothesis, the mathematical expectation of Vr must be zero. The 
distinction concerning expectations should now be clear, fziy individual 
investor may reasonably anricipane a positive value of interest earned 
~-e 
on the margin account, Vr > 0; however, in a mathematical sense, the 
efficient market hypothesis suggests that the expected value of 
interest in the maroin account considered over all investors is eoual 
33 
Holding Period 
Returns 
The futures market 
VJhen all fixed and variable transactions costs are accounted 
for in the ex ante consideration of the futures position, the holding 
period gain of the contract will be composed of the futures price 
established at time 0, FP; transactions costs including commissions, 
c, and initial margin, d; and investor expectations concerning the 
return on the margin account, Vr. By substituting for the variables 
above, an expression similar to Equation 4.S may be derived. The fol­
lowing shows the dollar return, R, per contract from the purchase of 
the m-day bill and the futures position when all costs are included: 
R = {[100 - ( - )?^ + d)] + [ (F~P^ - FP) (k) (r) ] }. (4.19-4.20) 
100 m m 
Unlike Equation 4.8 that consists of a certain return only, 
Ecuation 4.1'J-4.2C is compcscd of two parts: a nonrandorn component en­
closed in the first set of brackets and random component enclosed 
in the second set of brackets. Hence, the total return, R, is a 
random variable. The nature of the returns may be shown explicitly 
by grouping random variables from nonrandorn variables. Letting the 
constant A = [100 - (——' ^—^)?^ + d) , the total return is: 100 m 
R = A -r [Fpf - FP) (k) (r), (4.21) 
where again the first term is nonrandorn and [ (Fp"^ _ FP) (k) (r)] is a 
m 
random variable. Because the total return from arbitrage is uncertain. 
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the futures position must be regarded as a risky prospect. This 
suggests that investors or arbitrageurs will demand a risk premium 
to compensate them for bearing the risk of their futures position 
that arises in the margin account. 
An expression for this risk premium may be derived by considering 
the futures position in light of the expected utility hypothesis. By 
the expected utility hypothesis, a risk averter will, by definition, 
prefer a certain income to a random income taking on the values 
(Y^ - x) and {Y^ + x) with probabilities summing to unity, where Y^ 
equals certain wealth and x is the amount that can be i-ror. or lost by 
engaging in the risky prospect. In the present text, x corresponds 
to the interest earned (or foregone) on the margin account. Assuming 
that investors and arbitrageurs are risk averse and that their initial 
wealth position is Y , then their ending wealth position after 
arbitrage will be: 
(Y 4- R] = [Y -f A 4- (??- - FP(k)Cr}], {4.Z2 
o o m 
The total wealth position is uncertain; however, by employing the 
expected utility hypothesis, a risk premium can be determined that 
will make the investor or arbitrageur indifferent between receiving 
a certain income or the variable income of the futures position. 
Mathematically, zhe expected uriliry hypothesis may be expressed 
95 
expectations operator (in the mathematical sense) and Y and R are as 
previously defined. Defining the risk premium to equal 9 and in­
corporating it into Equation 4.23 results in an equilibrium condition 
that equates the utility of a certain income to that of a risky in­
come, 
U[Y + E(R) - 0] = E(U(Y + R)], (4.24) 
o o 
Equation 4.24 specifies the condition for indifference between a risky 
income as expressed on the right hand side of the equality and its 
certainty equivalent on the left. These concepts are illustrated in 
Figure 4.4, where the vertical axis represents total expected return, 
the horizontal axis represents the variance of total return, and the 
upward sloping indifference curve implies risk aversion. Utility is 
constant along the indifference curve. Point B represents a risky 
investment with an expected return of R^. R^ is a random return that 
2 
corresponds to Equation 4.19-4.20. The variance - - represents the risk 
associated with the futures position. Point 3, however, has a 
certainty equivalent point, R and the two, are related by 
the utility function. In terms of return, the difference between the 
uncertain return of R_ and its certaintv equivalent, R , is the risK 
B ' ce 
premium denoted by 8. With respect to Equation 4.24, point B is 
comparable to the expression on che right hand side of the equation 
and R is eauivalent to rhe left hand side. The utilitv of the 
ce 
certainly equivalent is related to the utility of the return of the 
E(R) 
)''i(juio 4.4. IJt.ilit.y i it risk-roturii sjjaco 
+[(%)) 
a 
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risky prospect by the risk premium, 6. 
The risk premium that equates the two utilities may be derived 
by using a Taylor expansion on Equation 4.24, and then solving for 6. 
For any arbitrary function cf) (x) , the Taylor series may be used to 
approximate that function around a certain value, x^. If $(x) is 
continuously differentiable at x^, then the function can be expanded 
around that point as follows : 
[(J) (x ) Ç ' (x ) (p" (x ) 
-I. J. — Cv_v 11 + R (4.25) 
• ••• • n! o' ' "n ' 
where (j)' , , 6"', etc. are the first, second and third derivatives 
of the function with respect to x (evaluated at x ), the denominators 
are expressed in factorial notation and R is a remainder term included 
n 
to represent the difference between 6(x), and the polynomial expansion 
of Ç(x). The Taylor series expansion may be constructed to any 
order oolvnorriial as long as ap-orooriate derivatives exisr. f'or 
nation to the original function, a second order polynomial, a quai^-
ratic, a third order polynomial a cubic, and so on. 
With respect to Equation 4.24, the left hand side of the equation 
may be expanded around 4- S (R) ] in order to yield: 
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Similarly, the right hand side of Equation 4.24 may be expanded around 
the mean of the random variable + R with the following result: 
U" (Y + E(R) ) 1 
E[U(Y + R) ] = U(Y + E(R)) + — + O-" + R (4.27) 
o o 2 1  R n 
To satisfy the condition of indifference between utilities, the right 
hand side of Equation 4.25 is set equal to the right hand side of 
Equation 4.27: 
U(Y + E(R)) - 0U' (Y + E(R)) + R = U (Y + E(R)) 
o o no
U"(Y + E(R)) _ 
O _ 2 . „ 
-r — -r 
21 R n 
and the risk premium may be solved for directly; 
.U" (Y + E(R) ) 
e=-- 2 0=^. (4.29) 
2U' (Y + E (R) ) ' 
o 
The risk premium may be thought of as a bribe. It is the amount 
of money that the risk averter would demand in compensation for 
bearing the risk to obtain an uncertain income. In the present 
context, 3 represents the airicant demanded by the arbitrageur in 
compensation for bearing the risk inherent in the futures position. 
From Scuation 4.29, it is evident that the risk premium defends on Y 
o 
and the Czstri^uticn of R, and will be posirive when -he raze of change 
cf marginal utility with respect -o wealth- U" (Y^ + E (R) ) ,. is negative, 
when risk aversion prevails, the measure of absolute risk aversion 
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r (Y -f E(R)) =-U"(Y + E ( R ) ) / U ' ( Y  + E(R)), will be positive. The re-
A o O O 
fore, the size of the risk premium will be a function of the degree 
x~ / V ~i. "C^ / "D \ ^ 3 4-V*^ T ra r-\ f 
2 
risky prospect, 0- . 
It should now be clear that the total expected return of a risky 
prospect is comprised of two components: the certainty equivalent 
of the risky prospect and the risk premium. This was illustrated in 
Figure 4.4. Therefore, the risk-adjusted expected reLuin may be 
expressed as: 
E[R] = R + 8, (4.30) 
ce 
where R^^ represents the certainty equivalent and 0 is the risk 
premium. Rearranging Equation 4.30 and substituting for E(R) and 9, 
the certainty equivalent of the futures position may be expressed as: 
R = {[100 - - d)] + [(F?® - FP((k)(r)] 
ce 100 m m 
. u"(Y 4 _ 
_ _ .  eg 14.31) 
Equation 4.31 is similar to Equation 4.8 in that it expresses the 
certain dollar return on the futures position. Unlike Equation 4.8, 
componenr of the margin account and the associated risk premium. For 
an individual investor, the value of R will deoend on the cash and 
ce 
futures prices at the time the futures position is initiated, the 
exoectation of interest earned on the marcin account, and the subiective 
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risk premium. Over all investors, however, the value of the second 
term [ - FP) (k) (r) ] , will equal zero according to the efficient 
market hypothesis. Even in this case, however, will equal the 
same constant tenr. expressed in Equation 4.8, and the risk premium 
will still be positive. 
In terms of rates, the certainty equivalent of Equation 4.31 
would correspond to a (unobserved) risk adjusted rate of return, r^^. 
By substituting for FP in Equation 4.31 and rearranging, the observed 
futures rate, r^, may be expressed in terms of a risk adjusted 
f 
rate, r^^, transactions costs and the risk premium; 
+ 155- - T5Ô' 
'm 
+ (^) (d-lOO, - (^) (- i 2,^ ,4,32, 
91P 91P^ U'(Y +E(R)) * 
m mo
Given cash prices (rates), it is clear from Equation 4.32 that the 
observed rate on a futures contract includes several components; a 
risk free rate, various transactions costs, and a risk premium. In 
general terms, the observed rare on a futures contract may be 
expressed as follows : 
+ SgG, (4.33) 
where , a. and a are undetermined parameters corresponding to 
the risk free futures rate, r" , transactions costs, C, and the risk 
ce 
The forward market 
The holding period return of an implicit forward contract may be 
derived from the yield curve of cash market securities. A yield curve 
represents the relationship between the yield to maturity and the term 
to maturity for a group of interest bearing securities with similar 
characteristics. In particular, it is usually assumed that the credit 
or default risk of the securities in identical. Thus, yield curves are 
usually drawn for homogeneous sets of securities such as Treasury bonds 
municipals securities, or certain grades of corporate debt. The yield 
curve is constructed as of a given date and it thus represents the 
structure of interest rates for a specified group of securities having 
similar characteristics other than maturity. The yield curve exhibits 
different shapes according to the current supply and demand for 
credit, monetary policy, and expectations of future economic conditions 
There exist several hypotheses that purport to explain the term 
expectations hypothesis of the term structure, has been presented by 
Kicks (1974) and Lutz (1940). This theory contains two propositions. 
The first hypothesis states that in competitive equilibrium, for a 
holding period of any given length, the holding period return on 
alternative investments will be the sair.e regardless of the maturity of 
the securities held in the portfolio. Implicit in the mathematics 
of the first hypothesis is the second proposition which states that 
under the above circumstances, observed long-term interest rates will 
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and short-term rates expected to prevail in the future. When this is 
true, the long-term investor will earn the same holding period return 
regardless of whether ;ie holds a long-term security to maturity or 
invests in successive short-term securities. 
Using the same notation as that presented by Malkiel (1955), let 
R and represent the currently observed rates on an m-day bill 0 m On ^ 
and an n-day bill. In addition, let r__ be the yield on a 91-day 
m yi 
bill that is expected to prevail at time m. This rate is not observable 
in the current period. For a holding period of 0-n, the investor has 
two options: he can purchase the n-day bill holding it to maturity or, 
alternatively, he can purchase the m-day bill and reinvest the pro­
ceeds at time m at a rate he expects to prevail at time m, i.e., ^ r^^. 
According to the pure expectations hypothesis, competitive equilibrium 
will ensure that the holding period returns of the two alternatives 
will be equal. Thus, for the two period case over a holding period 
^ ^ i I y o ;• 1 i c ^ wÀ V» ^  > o ^ ^ ^ ^ w — — S S ^ 
following equation. 
+ 3#ô = (1 + ^^0 ==91) ' 
where, in accordance with Figure 4.1, the subscript on the left 
of the observed rates represents the date at which the observation 
or expectation is made and the subscript on the right represents -che 
maturity of the security in question. In Equation 4.34, which expresses 
the equality of holding period returns, cwo points of the cash yield 
/4 "K\r 4-n c 
prevail 
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at time m, r , is not observed. However, it is implied in the mathe-
m 91 
matics since Equation 4.33 is one equation in one unknown and can be 
solved for the value oi r_. which will eauate the holding period 
m 
returns of the two alternatives. Equation 4.33 can be solved for _r^^ 
as follows : 
^ [1 + m/360 ] 
0 m 
Equation 4.35 expresses the forward rate implied in the term structure 
of cash market securities as of time 0. Suppose that one were to 
purchase an n-day bill and simultaneously sell an m-day bill. The 
net effect of these transactions would be an n-m period loan charac­
terized by an implied rate of return given by Equation 4.35. 
As an alternative to the spot market transactions, the same 
effective n-m period loan could be executed by purchasing a futures 
contract maturing in period m. It has been shown that the important 
cnaracterisrics mat cis-inguish a futures from d fowuxù 
from the influence of these characteristics, the rate on a long 
futures contract establishing an n-m period loan would be identical 
to the fo2rward rats expressed in Equation 4.55. In other words, 
the foriv'ard rata, _r^^ , would equal the certainty equivalent of the 
futures rate, r~^, as expressed in Equation 4.33. To be consistent, 
however, rhe statistical significance of transactions costs and the 
risk premium must be determined empirically. If it is found char chey 
are statistically significant, then one would not expect equality 
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between the observed futures rate and the forward rate, even in an 
efficient market. 
iiic oxa.: 
Forward Rates 
To the extent that returns on futures and forward transactions 
represent yields on similar (though not identical) types of invest­
ments, market participants will attempt to arbitrage the yields in 
the futures market and the yields in the spot market (which give rise 
to implied forward rates) if profitable trading opportunities exist. 
This potential for arbitrage should result in an equilibrium relation­
ship between observed futures and forward rates such that : 
r = r -r C + 0. (4.35) 
m 91 
Equation 4.36 shows explicitly that the rate on the forward contract, 
r^_, is identical to r" , the certainty ecuivalent of the observed 
m 91 ce 
rU"CUir^Sl5 iTclCti. iclA.ule —uc: uwcrcii uiic â-IiCt 
r^, = -rC -i- 8. (4.37) 
m 91 
Equation 4.37 shows that there will be a significant difference 
between the two rates if transactions costs and the risk premium are 
statistically significant. Even if arbitrage results in market 
«-o <r -v--r*o » 
rowarc rare, r ana r , respec-ive±y, noc necessarily ot 
lU 2^ 
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identical. The relationship between the two variables is an empirical 
matter which will depend on the significance of transactions costs 
and the risk premium. Empirical analysis that has purported to test 
the efficiency of the futures market by testing for the significance 
of the difference between r^ and r.^ has implicitly assumed that C 
m y 1 
and 9 are equal to zero. 
If it is not true that these variables are insignificant, then 
the nature of the bias between the forward and the futures rate must 
be explored on the basis of the values of these two terms. Assuming 
that Treasury securities are used to satisfy ths initial margin 
requirements, then the transactions costs consist only of commissions. 
Because they represent a fixed cost, the average cost of commission 
over time will decrease the longer the holding period of the contract. 
This suggests that in the short run, certainly for day trades or 
overnight positions, commissions will be much more significant than 
for longer arbitrage periods where they are spread out over tii^e. Thns. 
if any bias is imparted due to the existence of commissions, it will 
be more significant in short holding periods than in long ones. 
Finally, if investors who arbitrage the market are risk averse, 
then they will demand a positive risk premium. Their risk is likely 
to be positively related to the length of the holding period. There­
fore, the risk premium may increase with rime ro maturity. If, on 
the other hand, market participants have a preference for risk as 
speculators, then the risk premium m.ay be negative. 
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CHAPTER V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE STRUCTURE 
OF YIELDS 
Introduction and Purpose 
Chapter IV presented a theoretical analysis of the price structure 
existing between the futures and the cash markets. In this chapter 
empirical evidence is presented regarding the major propositions re­
sulting from the theoretical analysis. 
The first proposition is that the observed futures rate, r^, is 
composed of a risk free rate, , transactions costs, C, and a risk 
premium, 0. The risk premium is compensation for the risk incurred 
in the margin account. This includes the risk associated with: 1) 
interest foregone on margin calls which must be paid in cash, and 
perhaps even more important, 2) the inability to meet margin calls 
at all. The risk associated with the margin account is not present 
in the forward market. This distinction between the futures and 
forward markets has been ignored by previous authors. Thus, one 
purpose of this chapter is to determine the empirical significance 
of the risk premium. 
In Equation 4.36, the (unobserved) risk free rate on the futures 
wds s'-jjsLituted by the forward rate, and the resulting equa­
tion is repeated here: 
r~ = „r^, -i- C + 9 . (5.1) 
3v rearranging Equation 5.1, the difference between the futures rate 
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and the forward rate may be expressed as : 
=  =  +  0  •  1 5 - 2 1  
Following from the first proposition, the second states that if 
transactions costs, C, and the risk premium, 9, are significant to 
the analysis, then the difference between the futures rate and the 
forward rate will not be equal to zero, even in an efficient market. 
If this is true, then tests of the significance of the difference 
from zero are not appropriate tests for the efficiency of the market. 
Specific hypothesis 
The difference between the futures and forward rates is analyzed 
using summary statistics. The relationship between the difference and 
transaction costs and the risk premium is explored econometrically. 
Three hypotheses are tested. The first null hypothesis is that the 
difference between the two sets of rates is equal to zero: 
i_> — V . (5.3) 
where D = r~ - r . Tests of the significance of the difference are lu y X 
conducted by contract, by the average of all contracts, and over time. 
The second and third hypotheses concern the significance of 
transactions costs and the risk premium. The null hypothesis of both 
tests states that the coefficient on each of these variables used in 
a regression analysis to explain D is equal to zero. The alternative 
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hypothesis states that they are not equal to zero: 
^0= Be = 0, ^ 0 , (5.4) 
where is the coefficient on C, the variable representing trans­
actions costs, and: 
Measurement of risk and the risk premium 
It is clear from Equation 4.29 that the risk premium is a func­
tion of the subjective utility function and the variance of the return 
on the risky prospect. Difficulties arise, however, in the empirical 
estimation of the risk premium. Although the subjective utility-
function may be a very useful concept in theoretical analysis, the 
measurement of its parameters may be impossible. Similarly, the meas­
urement; of -he variance of the returns on the futures position is 
equally difficult to obtain ex ante to the initiation of the position. 
Given the difficulty of estimating various economic concepts, 
proxies are often used with the hope rhat they capture the essence 
r-.T t-h'= variable ir. question. 'vith respect to the risk premium, two 
separate proxies were used to simulate rhe risk associated wi-h the 
variance in the return on the futures position. The first proxy used 
was a variable called days to maturity (DTM). The second was a time-
(5.5a) 
where P. is the coefficient on 6, the measure of risk. 
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series variance of the futures rate. In the regression analyses which 
follow, the coefficients on each of these variables were tested 
for their significance. Coefficients significantly different 
from zero imply that commissions and a risk premium are 
significant components of the observed futures price. 
Data 
Futures data were obtained from the International Monetary Market 
of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The settlement prices for each 
of the 14 contracts analyzed were gathered on a daily basis over the 
nine months preceding the maturity date of each contract. Approxi­
mately 180 observations of the IMM index were recorded on each contract. 
A list of the futures contracts considered in the analysis is shown in 
the first column of Table A.l of Appendix A. The first two contracts 
traded on the Treasury bill futures market (March 1975 and June 1976) 
less than 9 months before they expired. 
The cash da-a, used to calculate forward rates implied in the 
term structure, we^e gathered from the "Composite Closing Quotations 
for U.S. Government Securities", provided by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York. Rates on 84 different Treasury bill issues were used in 
the calculation of the forward rates. The bid and ask yields were 
recorded for each day that a Treasury bill was used. Table A.l of 
Aocendix A lisrs the bills rhar were used in the calculation of forward 
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used. The last column of Table A.l shows the total number of yield 
observations on the cash bills which correspond to the relevant futures 
contract. 
The total data set consisted of observations of the IMM index 
and corresponding observations of bid and ask yields of the 
Treasury bills used to calculate forward rates. There were various 
holidays and other days when either the cash market or the futures 
market was closed. All observations for these days were discarded. 
In other words, futures and cash data were used only on those days 
when both exchanges were open. The total data set, including 
the daily price data for the futures contracts and the corresponding 
yield data on the relevant Treasury bills, consisted of 2,463 obser­
vations. From this data set, futures and forward rates were constructed 
and analyzed by contract and over time. 
UdUci i'lcLiiu-Ouj.ca.uù.Gri 
The initial objective of the analysis was to compare the futures 
rate to the forward rate on a day by day basis over the nine month 
holding period previous to the maturity date of each of the 14 futures 
contracts. To analyze the difference, o, of che two rciLes over time, 
the raw data ware manipulated to calculate a daily futures rate and the 
corresponding forward rate. 
Ill 
Futures rates 
The futures data were transformed such that continuously compounded 
yields replaced the observations of the IMM index. First, the annual 
discount rate on the futures contract was found by subtracting the 
IMM index from 100 : 
F 
Y = 100 - IMM index ^ (5.5b) 
F 
where Y is the annual discount rate on the futures contract. Using 
the standard formula for pricing Treasury bills, the futures discount 
•v~ ^ O* T.T C ' ^ O O4-f -» o v- -> /->• /-X -i- -4- 1 ^ -t- ^ Ç" <-• «-S^ . 
^ WS.. It >-*•—' V— V_ ^ A SMC * 4, ^ S_/ J- ^ J- L. • 
F? = [100- (^7-)Y^(100)] . (5.6) 
obU 
From investment theory it is well-known that the future value is 
related to present value over time by the rate of interest. As a 
natural exponential function, this may be expressed as follows: 
F = Pe--, (5.7) 
where F is the future value, P is present value, r is the continuously 
compounded rate of return, and t is the holding period. Rearranging 
Equation 5.7, the continuously compounded rate of return may be solved 
for as follows : 
r = (%) In (Î:) , (5.8) 
t f 
where In is the natural logarithm.. 
A- Their ma-uri-v. -che bills delivered on the fu-ures conrracr 
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have a value of $100.00, which is comparable to F in Equation 5.8. By 
substituting the appropriate futures variables for the holding period, 
t, and the present value, P, in Equation 5.8, the continuously com­
pounded rate of return on a futures contract was computed as follows; 
r" = [(^)ln(^)]. (5.9) 
In the manner of Equation 5.9, continuously compounded futures rates 
were calculated for each futures contract on each day of the nine 
months preceding the maturity date of the contract. 
Forward rates 
Due to various measurement problems, the cash data was manipu­
lated prior to the calculation of the forward rates. 
Maturity of cash bills and futures contracts Treasury bills, 
it will be recalled, are issued in maturities of 91 days, 182 days, 
and one year. The futures contract specifies delivery of the 90-day 
bill. Of the outstanding Treasury bills, there is only one—the 182-
day bill issued three months prior to the maturity date of the 
futures contract--which corresponds exactly to the delivery instru­
ment specified by the contract. At delivery, the short futures posi­
tion has %wo cpzicns: deliver the Sl-udy bill issued the day before 
expiration of rhe futures contract or deliver the outstanding six-
month bill which has 91 days to maturity. The delivery instruments 
are identical. This means that during the three months prior to the 
maturity date of the futures contract, time m in Figure 4.1, there 
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exist cash bills which coincide perfectly to the time dimension of the 
delivery vehicle. For this three month period, the means of the bid-
ask discount rate on Tieasury bills maturity at time m and n, 
respectively, were calculated as follows: 
, (5.10a) 
= (?NB + / (5-lOb) 
where Y,, and are the discount rates on bills which mature at time 
M N 
m and n, respectively, Y^^ and Y^^ are the bid yields, and Y^ and 
Y are the ask yields. 
The delivery issue on a futures contract does not exist prior 
to three months before the contract's expiration date. Therefore, the 
yield curve of cash bills was interpolated Lo estimate what the yield 
would have been on hypothetical bills with the same time dimensions 
relevant to the futures contract. For example, consider the 12-20-79 
contract, which called for delivery of a 51-day bill maturing on 3-lS-SO. 
Prior to 9-20-79, the delivery instrument on the furures contract 
had not yet been issued. Therefore, to calculate a yield comparable 
to a bill maturing on 3-19-80, the yield curve had to be interpolated 
using one-year bills, one maturing just prior to 3-19-80, and one maturinc 
just afrer 3-lS-SO. The one-year bills used were 3-4-80 and 4-1-80. 
As with the perfectly matched bills which exist during the three 
months prior to the maturity of the futures contract, the yields on 
the hvcothetical bills also represented the mean of the bid-ask vields. 
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They were calculated as follows : 
^ML = 'W " (5-lis' 
&U " «MBO + (S.LIB; 
^tro = '^NBU + , (5.lia, 
where Y _ is the mean of the bid-ask yields of the one-year bill 
ML 
maturing just prior to the hypothetical bill which would mature at 
time m. The bid yield is and the ask yield is . Calculated 
MBL MAL 
in a similar manner, Y^^ is the mean yield of the one-year bill 
maturing just after the time m hypothetical bill. Y _ and Y.,„ are the ÎMiJ MU 
mean yields on the one-year bills which surround the hypothetical 
bill maturing at time n. 
The yields represented by Equations 5.11a through 5.lid were 
m and n. It was assumed that the yield curve could be linearly 
—?P—"cri0 c'0riS2r3.j_ ifoinp. fozr tzriG j_2.n08.2r of 
r r\r \ fv \ ^ 
' ^ ' '"ML' . V- - . ' 
where (D^-D*) is the number of days between the maturity date of the 
/-* a 1 r-\ 1 I t avi /-I 4- r\ — 70 3 •V- i 1 1 'm;a-T-^ivi'nrT 4 n c f a*F+-o>- 1 4-
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and the one-year bill maturing just prior to it, and (D^-D^) is the 
number of days between the maturity dates of the one-year bills used 
in the interpolation. The linear interpolation of was calculated 
similarly. Figure A.l in Appendix A illustrates the interpolation 
process and Table A.2, also in Appendix A, lists the equations used 
to interpolate the cash bills corresponding to each of the futures 
contracts. 
Averaging the bid-ask yields of all cash bills and interpolating 
the one-year bills used during the time period prior to three months 
before the maturity date of the futures contract (when perfectly 
matched bills do not exist) results in a time series of Treasury bill 
discount rates on bills which correspond to the maturity date of the 
futures contract, time m, and the maturity date of the delivery 
instrument, time n. There were 14 separate time series of Treasury 
bill discount rates, Y and Y^, one series for each futures contract, 
and the discount rates were then used to construct forward rates im­
plied from the tenn structure. 
Continuously compounded forward rates To make the forward 
rates consistent with the futures rates, they were constructed on the 
basis of continuously compounded rates of return. On a per dollar 
basis and a 365 day year, the price of a 91-day Treasury bill due 
to mature n periods (one period equals 91 days) in the future is: 
91 91 gi 
—  r  w  ! — V -  t — 4 -  ^  T -  !  ^  1  r  ^  ^  
''t+l,t'365' • -t+2,t'365 "t-i-n,t ~355" 
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t + n, ^ is the currently observed spot rate on a 91-day Treasury 
bill due to mature in period t+1, and r^^^, i = 2...n, are the one 
period continuously compounded forward rates expected to prevail 
in future periods. Equation 5.13 may be rewritten as: 
(^) 
= p e t+n,t 365 (5.14) 
*n,t n-l,t 
and the continuously compounded forward rate may be solved for 
directly ; 
Vn,t= 
n. t 
To calculate a forward rate comparable to the futures rate, it 
was necessary to derive the cash prices for Treasury bills having the 
same maturity as that of the futures contract, time m, and of the 
delivery instrument, time n. Using the Treasury bill discount 
rates described previously, the prices of the m- and n-day cash 
Treasury bills were calculated using the standard formula for the 
price of a Treasury bill: 
--M - !5.16a) 
?,, = [100 - )Y^.(100} J  , (5.16b) 
where DTM represents days to maturity. 
Using these prices in Equation 5.15 the continuously compounded 
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Corresponding to the futures rates, forward rates were calculated 
on a daily basis for the nine months immediately preceding the maturity 
date of each futures contract. To have expanded the time series beyond 
nine months would have necessitated using coupon instead of discount 
securities with the result that the forward rates would not have been 
directly comparable to the futures rates. 
Having calculated the futures and the forward rates, the dif­
ference, D, between them was computed: 
D = / - (5.18) 
With these calculations completed, the basic data set consisted 
of observations on the futures rate, f , the forward rate, r , 
m yx 
their difference, D, and days to maturity, DTM, of each contract. 
SuirûTi^iTy Statistics and 
Analysis 
Having calculated the futures and for'^'ari rates, rhe dirfereuuc 
between them and the days to maturity for each observation by contract-
s'ommary statistics of the difference between tlie futures and ths 
forward rate were calculated by contract and over time. The major 
obje-'!""! VP- of the analysis of suirjnary statistics was to determine if 
the difference, D, was statistically different from zero. This part 
of the analysis abstracts from transactions costs and any risk prem.ium.s, 
only the difference between the two razes is considered. 
Table 5.1 shows summ.arv statistics on the difference berween r.he 
Table 13.1. Summary statistics on the difference between the futures rate and the forward rate 
foi- each contract and over all contracts, expressed over time and in nonanmialized 
basic-: points 
].2-20-79 9-20-79 6-21-79 3-22-79 12-21-78 9-21-78 6-22-78 
Quarter -39.17 -18.31 -8.70 -9.71 -25.78 -21.38 -14.45 
Nearest (-10.05) (-6.32) (-6.36) (-8.38) (-6.54) (-8.29) (-8.45) 
Maturity lul^' 40.89 21.'32 11.15 10.46 32.28 24.04 16.49 
(11.42) (9.07) (10.80) (10.06) (10.75) (11.20) (12.11) 
59 60 60 59 59 60 60 
Second U -90.04 -60.14 -93.84 -71.19 -06.51 -61.88 -44.02 
Quarter (-23.84) (-23, 31) (-21.48) (-24,68) (-29.76) (-22.85) (-32.27) 
|ul 90.04 60.1.4 93.84 71.19 86.51 61.88 44.02 
(23.84) (23.51) (21.48) (24.68) (29.76) (22.85) (32.27) 
N 62 60 60 60 62 62 59 
Third U -100.80 -01.71 -04.10 -00.44 -55.26 -18.26 -35.24 
Quarter (-lO.lil) (-62.30) (-19.66) (-33.74) (-17.96) (-13.77) (-47.86) 
|u| 100.80 01.71 84.10 88.44 55.26 10.26 35.24 
(lO.lil) (62.30) (19.66) (33.74) (17.96) (13.77) (47.86) 
N 54 53 40 63 58 53 49 
En Li re U .-78.60 -52.41 --60.65 -57.23 -56.37 -34.78 -30.90 
Nine (-23.00) (-21.80) (-16.71) (-20.10) (-21.07) (-17.04) (-24.32) 
Months lui 79.26 53.39 61.52 57.47 58.51 35.69 31.63 
(23.79) (23.45) (17.37) (20.30) (24.35) (18.31) (27.30) 
N 175 173 160 102 179 175 168 
''Mean. 
^'t sLatistics Eor testing the nuJ. 1 hypothesis that the mean equals zero. 
^ Mean absolute value .. 
"•'Number of observations . 
'J'abl<2 5. 1-
3-23-78 
-16.64 
(-14.62) 
16.72 
(14.96) 
58 
-38.80 
(-20.77) 
38.80 
(20.27)  
GO 
4.43 
(2 .39)  
12 .68  
(12.92)  
58 
-17.25 
(-10.46) 
22.91 
(19.2 3) 
176 
(Cont. !' 
12-22-77 
-22.64 
( -16 .10)  
22.64 
( 1 6 . 1 0 )  
59 
-33.66 
(-16.30) 
33.66 
(16.30) 
61 
7.89 
(2.91)  
18.2 3 
(11.14) 
59 
-16.33 
(-9.09) 
24.94 
(22.51)  
179 
9-22-77 
-6.78 
(-7.87) 
7.79 
(11.10) 
60 
-•11.76 
(-6.62) 
16. 31 
(15.82) 
62 
48.76 
(13.97) 
48.76 
(13.97) 
56 
8.96 
(3.72) 
23.65 
(13.40) 
178 
6-23-77 
-6.99 
(-6.53) 
8.92 
(11.21) 
61 
-9.48 
(-5.12) 
14.45 
(11.90) 
62 
-11.81 
(-5.13) 
16.44 
(10.34) 
48 
-9.24 
(-9.14) 
13.04 
(17.97)  
171 
Over all 
3-24-77 12-23-76 9-23-76 Contracts 
-2.62 -9.32 -3.12 -14.68 
(-3.12) (-9.50) (-5.48) (-13.97) 
5.11 10.17 4.18 16.55 
(8.31) (12.35) (9.50) (18.34) 
60 59 61 63 
-20.65 -22.80 -4.28 -46.27 
(-15.59) (-17.62) (-2.44) (-64.96) 
20.79 22.69 12.05 47.57 
(16.16) (18.38) (12.11) (71.04) 
60 62 62 64 
11.16 16.97 -18.76 -27.87 
(4.11) (8.99) ( -4 .31)  (-14.62) 
18.90 18.19 26.54 42.96 ^ 
(10.20) (10.82) (7.52) (33.99) 
60 60 55 73 
-4.03 -5.23 -8.36 -30.01 
(-2.83) (-3.52) (-5.32) (-37.80) 
14.93 17.21 13.83 36.19 
(15.98) (20.37) (10.36) (53.13) 
180 181 173 2463 
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futures and the forward rates for each contract and over all contracts, 
expressed over time and in nonannualized basis points. Each column in 
Table 5.1 represents a separate futures contract with the most recent 
contract on the left and the average over all contracts on the right. 
The first three rows represent analysis by quarters preceding the 
maturity date of each contract and the bottom row includes summary 
statistics over the entire nine months of trading. The mean of the 
difference of the futures and forward rates for each quarter preceding 
maturity is shown above the t-statistic (in parentheses) which tests 
its significance from zero. All t-values are significant at the 5 
percent level. The number of observations included in each of the 
averages is also shown. 
For the first quarter of each contract, the statistics show that 
the mean of the difference is negative. Averaged over all contracts, 
the for\\'ard rate exceeds the futures rate by approximately 15 basis 
points. Because the average of deviations of opposite sign tend to 
offset one another, the mean of the absolute value of the basis point 
differential was also calculated. The m.ean absolute value, signified by 
|u|, is larger than the arithmetic mean of the difference, indicating 
that for each contract, there were positive observations of the dif­
ference, -chat is, the futures rate exceeded the fcr-.-.-ard ra%e. All t-
statistics, shewn in parentheses below the mean absolute difference, 
C C«>4 A w » 
In the second quarter preceding the maturity of each contract, 
the for-.;ard rate increased relative to the futures rate. In Table 5.1, 
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this is reflected in larger values for the mean difference. For most 
of the contracts, the mean absolute difference is identical to the 
rr^an difference indicating that there were very few, if any, observa­
tions in the second quarter where the futures rate exceeded the for­
ward rate. The growing divergence between the futures and forward 
rates in the second quarter is also reflected by very large t-
statistics. Over all contracts, the forward rate exceeded the futures 
rate by an average of 46 basis points. 
During the third quarter preceding maturity, the mean difference 
declined for most contracts as the futures rate rose relative to the 
forward rate. In fact, for five of the contracts, the mean difference 
became positive with futures rates exceeding forward rates. Over all 
contracts, the forward rate was an average of 28 basis points greater 
than the futures rate. However, the large mean absolute value suggests 
that there were a large number of observations where the mean dif-
-o-r-c.vir<= between futuxes aiid forward was positive. 
Statistics over the entire nine months of trading show that with 
the exception of one contract, the mean difference was negative. Over 
all contractsr the forward rate exceeded the futures rate by 30 basis 
points. 
The statistics in Table 5.1 clearly indicate that the dif­
ference between the futures and forward rates, both over time and 
by contract, is significantly different from zero. On the average, the 
difference is small at the time of maturity, increases during the first 
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and second quarters, and then begins to decrease during the third 
quarter. The difference also increases across contracts. In the 
second quarter for example, the 9-23-75 contract had an average dif­
ference of only -4 basis points. However, by the time the 12-20-79 
contract was trading, the difference was -90 basis points. This in­
creasing discrepancy between the futures and forward rates over 
contracts may suggest that opportunities for arbitrage have increased 
rather than decreased as the market has matured. The opposite was 
expected ex ante to the analysis. 
The statistics in Table 5.1 are presented on a nonannualized 
basis. If the basis point differential is any indication of potential 
arbitrage opportunities, then the results in Table 5.1 suggest that 
the greatest opportunity for arbitrage would occur during the second 
quarter preceding the maturity date of the futures contract. How­
ever, it must be recognized that for a hold-to-maturity strategy, 
arbitrage -realized in the first cruartsr can be earned in a 
shorter period of time than those in the second or third quarters. 
For this reason, the basis point differentials were adjusted to 
reflect the holding period of the contract. The following adjustment 
was used to annualize the basis point differential: 
3" = , (5.IS) 
where d" is the annualized basis point differential and DTM, as be-
Ta))Io 5.2. 
Quarter 
Nearest 
Maturi ty 
Second 
Quarter 
Th i rd 
Querter 
Ent ire 
Nine 
Month!! 
Summary statistic;; on the difference between the futures rate and the forward rate 
for each contract and over all contracts, expressed over time and in annualized 
basis points 
| u |  
. d 
U 
N 
U 
12-20-79 
(-6.87) 
499.72 
(9.40) 
59 
-241.43 
(--40.40) 
241.43 
(40.40) 
62 
-109.43 
(•-15.03) 
109.43 
(15.f)3) 
54 
-2H8.G9 
(-12.69) 
312.47 
(14.97) 
1.75 
9-20-79 
(-3.50) 
163.93 
(12.75) 
60 
-•173. 
(-15. 
173. 
(15. 
60 
99 
5!i) 
99 
5!il 
-143.72 
(-59.3H) 
136.72 
(59.3:3) 
53 
-129.7:3 
( -14.02)  
]59.0 3 
(26. 3 3) 
170 
6-21-79 
4.29 
( 0 . 1 2 )  
151.37 
(4 .82)  
60 
-248.93 
(-34.67)  
248.93 
(34.67) 
60 
-140.28 
(-16.57) 
148.28 
(16.57)  
48 
-129.73 
( - 8 . 1 2 )  
105.33 
(15.10) 
168 
3-22-79 
-72.02 
(-5.83) 
100.26  
(12.11) 
59 
-204.56 
(-20.42) 
204.56 
(20.42) 
60 
-145.91 
(-30.49) 
145,91 
(30.49) 
63 
-141.29 
(-21.00) 
150.45 
(27.24)  
182 
Moan. 
12-21-78 
-140.82 
( -4 .24)  
245.64 
(12.20) 
59 
-233.75 
(-36.45)  
233.75 
(36.45) 
62 
-96.16 
(-14.55) 
96.16 
(14.55) 
58 
-158.54 
(-13.09) 
192.09 
(21 .81)  
179 
I) ; statistics i:or testing the null, hypothesis that tJie mean ïcjuals zero. 
9-21-70 
-102.16 
(-4.19) 
193.50 
(16.57) 
60 
-181.38 
( -17.26)  
181.38 
(17.26)  
62 
-32.10 
( -12.07)  
32.10 
(12.07) 
53 
-109.01 
(-10.67) 
140.32 
(18.18) 
175 
6-22-78 
-82.13 
(-4.44) 
145.11 
(14.54) 
60 
-128.31 
(-20.31) 
128.31 
(20.31) 
59 
-60 .66  
(-32.03) 
60.66 
(32.03) 
49 
-92.09 
(-12.64) 
114.58 
(22.83) 
168 
'Mc'an absolute value. 
• I  Number of obs(!rvations. 
Ta))lo 5.2. (Cont.) 
3-23-78 
-142.85 
(-16.21) 
146.43 
(18.99) 
58 
-115.05 
(-16.00) 
13 5.05 
(16 .00)  
60 
5.27 
(1.73) 
20.70 
(13.70) 
58 
-84.56 
(-13.( ,0)  
94.30 
(17.59) 
176 
-197.54 
(--24,77) 
197.54 
(24.-'7) 
59 
-100.53 
(-13.11) 
100.53 
(13.11) 
61 
10.41 
(2.37) 
29.72 
( 1 2 . 2  6 )  
59 
-95.94 
(-12.05) 
109.17 
(17.15) 
179 
9-22-77 
-48.79 
(-3.12) 
86.68 
(6.90) 
60 
-38.24 
(-7.10) 
48.29 
(12.58) 
62 
78.97 
(15.06) 
78.97 
(15.06) 
56 
-4.92 
(-0.60) 
70.88 
(14.54) 
173 
6-23-77 
-77.78 
(-7.43) 
88.83 
(10 .00)  
61 
-26.93 
(-5.53) 
39.70 
(12.71) 
62 
-21.37 
(-5.20) 
28.85 
(9.68) 
48 
-43.51 
(-9.27) 
54.18 
(13.58) 
171 
1-24-77 12-23-76 9-23-76 
Over all 
Contracts 
-31.72 -72.64 -33.69 -107.81 
(-3.97) (-6.23) (-5.41) (-13.68) 
50.60 95.29 44.28 157.16 
(8.26) (11.37) (8 .85)  (20.66) 
60 59 61 63 
-58.21 -67.47 -17.22 -130.66 
-14.67) (-14.47) (-3.20) (-32.12) 
58.60 67.79 36.50 133.81 
(15.15) (14.78)  (10.56) (35.22) 
60 62 62 64 
15.15 26.80 -26.94 -47.12 
(3.65) (8.78) (-4.05) (-14.01) 
29.25 29.24 41.15 70.68 
(11.35) (11.06) (8.03) (29.37) 
60 60 55 73 
-24.93 -37.91 -25.87 -97.33 
(-6.27) (-7.00) (-7.34) (-32.09) 
46.15 63.97 40.60 123.52 
(17.02) (16.74) (15.48) (47.20) 
180 181 178 2463 
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They are consistent with those reported in Table 5.1 in that the dif­
ference between the futures and forward rates is significantly dif­
férant frcni zero, both by contract and over time. However, due to 
the annualization, the differentials have increased substantially for 
each contract and over all contracts. For example, the differential 
of the first quarter of the most recent contract considered, 12-20-79, 
was over four hundred basis points. This is a substantial difference 
which would seem to indicate strong opportunities for arbitrage. How­
ever, the annualization process assumes that the differentials that 
occur in the short run will be replicated throughout the year, per­
haps an assumption which is too strong in such a volatile market. 
To illustrate the summary statistics included in Tables 5.1 and 
5.2, the difference between the futures rate and the forward rate was 
plotted by days to maturity for each contract and over all contracts. 
Figure 5.1 shows the average difference over all 14 contracts plotted 
by dayc to maturity. The difference expressed in basis Doints. 
Points below the dashed line in Figure 5.1 indicate that the futures 
rate is less than the forward rate and points above the line indicate 
the opposite. Figure 5.1 clearly shows that the futures and forward 
rates coincide at the maturity date of the futures contract. How­
ever, as days to maturity increase, the forward rate rises relative to 
the futures rate and overall, the difference seems to follow a quad­
ratic pattern as the days to maturity increase. At 90 days to maturity, 
chcre is a discontinuity in the quadratic curve caused by the change 
m 
«WaBHBBIMIHiH ••IBllllHilEIMIlliËIll 
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Days to maturity 
l'i(jL;ro 5.1. Plot of Tuturo.s rate minus forward rate by days to maturity ovor all 
f.-oiit rat.-t:s, axpro.ssod in basis points 
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in the procedure for calculating forward rates. Prior to 90 days. 
Treasury bills with the exact maturity dimensions of the futures 
contract are used to calculate forward rates. Beyond 90 days, one-
year bills are used in the interpolation process previously described 
to calculate the forward rates. It is apparent that the interpola­
tion of the one-year bills and the creation of hypothetical bills 
which have the exact time dimensions of the futures contract and its 
delivery issue imparts an upward bias to the forward rates. Thus, 
the basis point differentials in the second and third quarters may not 
be as large as this analysis suggests. Graphs similar to Figure 5.1 
were plotted for each of the 14 contracts and are included in Appendix 
B. 
To further illustrate the pattern of futures and forward rates, 
the difference and the absolute difference were averaged and listed by 
weeks to maturity. Table 5.3 shows the average deviation (D) and 
average absolute deviation (|D}) of the futures minus the forward 
rate, expressed in basis points for each contract and over all con­
tracts, by weeks to marurizy. As with Figure 5.1, Table 5.3 shows that 
the futures and forward rates have similar values az the maturity date 
of the contract, but diverge as weeks to maturity increase. The average 
absolute difference gives some indication of the degree of variation 
of the difference near the maturity date of the futures contract. 
Three to five weeks prior to maturity, however, the average absolute 
deviation becomes very similar (in absolute value) to zhe average 
deviation indicating that ver}'' few of the observations on the dif­
ference are positive. 
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Table 5.3. Average deviation (D) and average absolute deviation 
(1D[) of the futures rate from the forward rate, 
expressed in basis points for each contract and over all 
contracts. 
Weeks co 
Maturity 
12—2C— 5-20-79 6-21 _-70 
D |D| D |D| D • |D|  
1 - 5.27 10.38 — 0.53 2.26 10.35 10,35 
2 - 27.04 27.04 5.77 5.77 3.02 5.94 
3 - 41.83 41.83 11.43 11.43 - 2.15 5.25 
4 - 59.68 59.68 - 1.76 4.05 - 10.73 10.73 
5 - 69.75 69.76 - 4.58 4.82 - 3.64 4.19 
6 - 43.65 43.65 - 12.23 12.23 - 9.24 9.24 
7 — 61.33 51.89 - 22.28 22.28 - 7.29 7.29 
8 - 68.80 68.80 - 23.04 23.04 - 11.96 12.11 
9 - 15.89 17.58 - 25.44 25.44 - 25.16 25.16 
10 - 9.51 14.24 - 34.39 34.39 - 22.97 22.97 
11 1.52 10.72 - 28.42 28.42 - 9.71 9.71 
12 - 36.84 36.84 - 43.70 43.70 - 10.43 10.43 
13 - 71.89 71.89 - 65.72 66.72 - 13.55 13.55 
14 - 68.04 58.04 - 76.84 76.84 - 42.92 42.92 
15 - 61.90 61.90 - 95.41 95.41 - 54.40 54.40 
16 - 75.15 75.15 - 65.32 65.32 - 77.54 77.54 
17 - 62.76 62.76 - 79.81 79.81 - 75.68 75.58 
18 - 68.29 68.29 - 36.50 36.50 - 78.75 78.75 
19 - 67.98 67.98 - 54.23 54.23 - 90.73 90.73 
20 - 98.58 98.68 - 37.25 37.25 - 86.12 85.12 
21 -108.77 108.77 - 50.44 50.44 - 94.58 94.58 
22 - 83.86 83.86 - 62.87 62.87 -106.52 105.52 
23 - 95.49 96.49 - 47.72 47.72 -117.78 117.78 
24 —110.62 j-xG .62 - . 14 J. .  -133.51 -i r>rs C -I 
25 -143.48 143.48 - 60.72 60.72 -155.17 155.17 
-155.55 155.55 — -7/-> -3 O 70 P. -136.57 136.67 
27 -136.30 136.30 - 57.13 67.13 -102.34 102.34 
23 —162•60 1S2 SO - 77 96 77.96 -107.82 107.82 
29 -158.91 158.91 - 85.15 85.16 -108.72 108.72 
30 -144.38 144.38 - 85.74 86.74 —100./ / J.VV • / / 
31 -116.90 116.90 - 77.70 77.70 -106.22 106.22 
32 -112.11 112.11 - 79.21 73.21 — 86 -29 86.29 
33 -116.45 116.46 - 32.13 32.13 -  7B.BW /"Ô. 68 
34 -  81.82 81.82 - 88.15 88.15 - 54.10 54.10 
OC 
_ SI.07 C 1 r\-j - 25 _ 21 35.21 - 32.87 32.87 
35 - 39.55 39.55 - 90.77 90.77 - 45.01 45.01 
37 - 54.72 54. 72 - 71 _ 21 71.21 . « 
38 
-?Q 
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Table 5.3. CCont.) 
Weeks to 
Maturity 
3-22-79 
D 
12-29^78 9-21-78 
1 1.34 1.58 2.49 3.01 4.13 4.13 
2 0.54 3.64 -  3.01 3.10 7.33 7.33 
3 - 4.72 4.72 1.49 5.42 6.87 7.22 
4 - 10.09 10.09 17.02 17.02 - 13.89 14.46 
5 - 15.57 15.57 10.95 29.19 - 20.58 20.58 
6 - 11.48 11.48 - 53.91 53.91 - 4.14 4.60 
7 - 16.77 16.77 - 33.25 33.25 - 13.16 13.16 
8 -  17.41 17.41 - 10.71 15.48 - 37.13 37.13 
9 - 17.20 17.20 - 45.73 45.73 - 42.90 42.90 
10 - 5.43 7.21 — 66.69 66.69 - 36.38 36.38 
11 - 1.34 1.91 - 50.73 50.73 - 28.64 28.64 
12 - 6.29 6.29 - 52.65 52.65 - 42.08 42.08 
13 - 32.29 32.29 - 32.05 32.05 - 52.44 52.44 
14 - 66.24 66.24 - 41.40 41.40 -  70.28 70.28 
15 - 75.03 75.03 - 62.65 62.65 - 74.53 74.53 
16 - 76.89 76.89 - 67.96 67.96 - 74.13 74.13 
17 - 67.95 67.95 - 81.08 81.08 -  79.52 79.52 
18 - 90.55 90.55 - 90.82 90.82 - 93.30 93.30 
19 -106.66 106.66 -104.44 104.44 - 86.20 86.20 
20 - 84.79 84.79 -107.89 107.89 - 72.72 72.72 
21 - 95.07 95.07 -112.59 112.59 - 63.70 63.70 
22 - 74.00 74.00 - 95.35 95.35 - 52.40 52.40 
23 - 52.65 52.65 - 87.09 87.09 - 39.71 39.71 
24 - 45.00 45.00 - 88.40 88.40 - 27.49 27.49 
25 - 34.73 34.73 - 99.96 - 99.96 - 30.68 30.68 
— 4G•01 _ 1 -7T 1 r\n -71 _ T7 OO 37.  ^ 0 
27 - 68.29 68.29 - 91.96 91.96 - 32.22 32.22 
28 -  84.55 84.55 - 81.73 81.73 - 25.72 25.72 
29 — 97.87 97.87 - 73.77 73.77 - 26.78 26.78 
30 -106.09 106.09 - 65.51 65.51 - 24.39 24.39 
31 -103.50 103.50 - 67.39 67.39 - 15.56 15.56 
32 —-LXO . / S 110.73 - 53.53 59.62 - 12.22 12.22 
33 -107.98 107.98 - 42.82 42.82 - 18,34 18.34 
34 -103.26 103.26 - 33.79 33.79 -  12.24 12.24 
— 35.52 — S.j2 
36 - 87.06 87.06 - 37.40 37.40 - 12.68 12.68 
37 
- 74.57 74.57 - 26.29 26.29 - 4.32 4.32 
38 - 55.73 55.73 - 22.28 22.28 
39 - 46.30 46.30 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
15 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
25 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
33 
36 
3 7 
(Cont.) 
5—22—7 8 3-23-78 12-22-77 
D D D 
1.15 2.92 - 1.43 1.43 - 1.85 1.85 
3.58 3.58 - 3.24 4.16 - 5.03 5.03 
5.05 5.05 - 7.29 7.29 - 13.15 13.15 
1.73 4.89 - 13.72 13.72 - 19.87 19.87 
- 17.12 17.12 - 16.65 16.65 - 18.58 18.68 
- 24.41 24.41 - 17.50 17.60 - 25.73 25.73 
- 15.34 15.34 - 18.55 18.66 - 27.04 27.04 
- 23.34 23.34 - 25.68 25.68 - 30.55 30.66 
- 35.18 36.18 - 21.05 21.05 - 34.10 34.10 
- 27.44 27.44 - 24.75 24.75 - 33.91 33.91 
- 17.08 17.08 - 18.10 18.10 - 31.84 31.84 
- 14.22 14.22 - 23.55 23.55 - 30.87 30.87 
- 17.85 17.85 - 30.05 30.05 - 19.94 19.94 
- 43.48 43.48 - 45.58 45.58 - 30.19 30.19 
- 55.44 55.44 
- 41.89 41.89 - 49.24 49.24 
- 58.38 58.38 - 50.57 50.57 - 63.27 53.27 
- 57.41 57.41 - 58.40 58.40 - 58.18 58.18 
- 47.27 47.27 - 54.84 54.84 - 41.92 41.92 
- 41.91 41.91 - 54.95 54.95 - 40.43 40.43 
- 40.73 40.73 - 39.58 39-68 - 32.21 32.21 
- 39.59 39.59 - 38.73 38.73 - 24.91 24.91 
- 39.14 39.14 - 39.22 39.22 - 24.84 24.84 
- 42.50 42.50 - 25.87 25.87 - 10.89 10.89 
- 40.54 40.54 - 15.04 15.04 - 15.79 15.79 
- 29.31 29.31 - 17.74 17.74 - 19.05 19.05 
-
' -iv 40 < > /dt'i 
- 1 ? ^ - 21 .11 21.11 
- 42.99 42.99 - 10.82 10.82 - 16.20 15.20 
- 31.28 31.28 - 10.15 10.15 - 14.94 14.94 
- 38.38 38.38 - 13.91 13.91 - 11.43 11.43 
- 40.45 40.45 - 9.07 9.07 - 8.02 8.02 
- 32.94 32.94 1.27 5 .15 10.56 11.67 
- 20.93 30.90 4.52 6.14 17 .72 17.72 
- 35.92 35.92 17.79 17.79 26.22 26.22 
- 33.78 33.78 15.97 16.97 37.05 37.05 
10.01 10 TO. 07 IS. S7 
- 32.51 32.51 27.54 27.64 1.86 6.14 
19.01 19.01 3.81 9.64 
5.53 6.53 42.16 42.16 
skz 
tur 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
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(Cont.) 
9-22-77 6-23-77 3-24-77 
D D D 
1.61 2.65 - 1.57 1.57 - 1.91 2.15 
- 1.26 2.10 - 0.23 1.26 - 0.81 1.97 
0.01 2.71 - 4.45 4.45 - 0.67 1.55 
- 10.21 10.77 - 9.01 9.01 - 5.12 5.12 
- 10.95 10.95 - 11.59 11.59 - 1.73 2.49 
- 8.20 8.20 - 21.92 21.92 - 4.92 4.96 
1.70 3.00 - 13.09 13-09 - 3.56 3.56 
- 10.49 10.49 - 7.02 7.02 - 4,30 4.30 
- 12.57 12.57 - 12.18 12.18 4.77 4.77 
- 6.87 6.87 - 8.65 8.65 1.63 4.61 
- 2.99 3.46 - 10.19 10.19 4.18 6.99 
- 9.06 5.06 4.59 6 21 - 10. 37 10; 37 
- 17.64 17.64 7.53 7.53 - 19.40 19.40 
- 22.25 22.25 - 9.15 13.68 - 25.17 25.17 
- 26.53 26.53 - 17.18 17.18 - 20.79 20.79 
- 25.52 25.52 - 14.54 14.54 - 19.29 19.29 
- 17.19 17.19 - 5.20 7.74 - 29.27 29.27 
- 17.74 17.74 - 2.88 10.09 - 17.32 17.32 
- 15.88 15.88 - 19.62 19.62 - 14.15 16.28 
3.13 7.31 - 12.42 12.42 - 11.70 11.70 
- 5.87 5.87 - 2.94 4.99 - 13.03 13.03 
- 22.69 22.69 - 9.19 9.19 - 9.09 9.09 
- 11.03 11.03 - 3.76 9.83 - 28.02 28.02 
- 9.73 1 r\ r»c 16.09 21.43 - 36 = 25 36.25 
16.82 16.82 - 25 .08 25. OS - 26.66 26.66 
13.19 13.19 - 32.75 32.75 - 11.73 11.73 
14.41 14.41 - 30.59 30.59 - 10.72 
19.19 19.19 - 25.60 25.60 - 8.74 9.64 
34,75 34.75 - 8,43 12.26 - 6.90 6. 90 
37.33 37.33 - 22.54 22.54 — 4.44 5.36 
35.49 35.49 - 8,72 10.35 - 11,95 11.95 
74.34 74.34 10.16 10.70 - 2.15 5.57 
83 = 64 83.64 0.86 5.92 19.11 19.11 
84.31 84.31 4.47 6,50 21.79 21.79 
56.65 56.65 - 0.31 7.01 26.65 25 65 
61.62 61.62 - 26.90 26.90 38.45 3o • 45 
44.31 44.31 
• • 
41.60 
38.93 
41.60 
33.93 
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Table 5.3. (Cont.) 
Weeks to 12-23-76 9-23-76 Over all Concraccs 
Maturity D \D\ D [oj D jo] 
1 - 3.19 3.19 0.29 0.50 0.33 3.41 
2 2.95 4.11 - 1.10 1.74 - 1.38 5.50 
3 - 1.19 4.31 - 4.91 4.91 - 4.41 8.64 
4 - 7.59 7.59 - 8.33 8.33 - 11.27 13.59 
5 - 2.21 3.47 - 4.45 4.45 - 13.41 16.61 
6 - 8.34 8.34 - 3,56 3.56 - 17.48 17.52 
7 - 7.29 7.29 - 3.73 4.95 - 16.21 16.65 
8 - 12.00 12,00 - 0.33 2.98 - 20.32 20.87 
9 - 16.99 16,99 - 3.63 4.27 - 21.74 22.60 
10 - 14.21 14.21 0.48 5.05 - 20.82 22.16 
11 - 17.46 17.46 - 0.40 1.93 - 14,57 16.38 
12 - 17.31 17.31 - 6.57 6.73 - 21.54 22.40 
13 - 15.08 15.08 - 6.55 6.55 - 27,88 29.02 
14 - 26.90 26.90 - 19.14 19.14 - 41.97 42.29 
15 - 27.28 27.28 - 16.26 16.26 - 49,18 49.18 
16 - 29.85 29.85 - 18.20 18.20 - 50.72 50.72 
17 - 34.17 34.17 - 16.09 16.09 - 50.63 50.84 
18 - 36.90 36.90 - 18.03 18.03 - 49.95 50.38 
19 - 28,50 28.50 - 7.34 8.00 - 52.48 52.66 
20 - 21.81 21.81 16.88 16.88 - 44.19 47.45 
21 - 18.13 18.13 14.13 14.13 - 47.17 49.40 
22 - 19.02 19.02 5.70 5.70 - 45.27 46.09 
Z. 3 
- m 1 " o no 1 c 4 w X - àZ' . Û3.33 
24 - 12.98 12.98 - 2.77 5.02 - 42.27 45.30 
25 - 14.61 14.61 0,45 3.24 - 46.03 46.03 
26 - 4.86 6 76 2.33 7.28 - 45.53 48.51 
27 - 2.76 2.76 5.76 5.98 - 41.99 44,92 
28 8.90 8.90 6,76 6.76 - 42.59 47.63 
29 5.88 5.38 10.63 10,63 - 41.44 49.38 
30 14.52 14.52 13,71 15.76 - 33.49 44.49 
31 22.IS 22.IS - 8.00 9.83 - 34 ..91 44.86 
32 24.90 - - 26.57 / 7 _ 42_ 
33 41.28 41.28 - 9.88 9.88 - 21.24 49.39 
34 33.44 33.44 - 42.53 42.53 - 18.31 47.00 
35 17.51 17.51 - 61.07 61.07 - 20.69 39.96 
35 14.40 14.40 - 73.41 73.41 - 21.13 42.31 
37 18.43 18.43 - 60.51 60.51 - 14.45 38.74 
38 15.28 15.28 5.68 30.88 
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The tables and charts presented above lead to the conclusion that 
the difference between the futures and forward rate is equal to zero 
only at the maturity of ths futures contract and is significantly dif­
ferent from zero in the weeks preceding maturity. In addition, it 
is clear that over all contracts, the difference between the futures 
and forward rates follows a quadratic pattern over time. Having 
demonstrated the sigr.ificance of the difference from zero over time, 
the question still remains as to whether this implies market in­
efficiency or not. If the difference can be explained on the basis 
of the variables which distinguish a futures from a forward con­
tract, then it does not necessarily follow that a significant 
difference implies market inefficiency. 
Regression Analysis 
The objective of the regression analysis was to determine if 
•crdiiibciijlloiis cos'cs and the for risK significant ixi 
explaining the difference over time. According to the theory, these 
variables, if they are significant- should provide the basis for 
believing chat the difference between the futures and forward rates 
may not equal zero, even in an efficient market. 
Transactions costs 
In Chapter IV- it was assumed that the initial margin require­
ment ($1500) was satisfied by depositing Treasury securities with the 
broker or clearing house. Thus, the only transactions costs incurred 
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were the ($60.00) commissions per contract. Paid at the termination 
of the contract, commissions represent a fixed cost with respect to 
the holding period. Therefore, it was assumed that they would have a 
declining influence the longer the holding period. Expressed as a 
percentage of the initial margin requirement, the variable used to 
represent the commission charges was : 
= = # 
where C represents costs and DTM is, as before, days to maturity 
and dC/dDTM < 0. 
The risk premium 
A risk averter will demand a positive risk premi'ôiri; those who 
prefer risk may require a negative risk premium. The premium de­
veloped in Chapter IV was based on the risk associated with the margin 
account, i.e., the risk of margin interest foregone, and the po­
tential inability to meet margin calls when the broker or clearing 
house requires them. The components of the risk premium, the sub­
jective utility function, and the variance of the returns on che 
futures position, are unobservable ex ante to the execution of the 
T-.-.'o variables were used as proxies for risk—days to maturity", 
and a time series variance of the observed futures rate. Days-to-
maturity was used (intuitively) to capture the risk of the margin 
account as the length of the holding period increased. It was maintained 
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that the risk associated with the margin account would increase with 
the length of the open futures position. The second proxy, the vari­
ance of the observed futures rate was calculated sequentially by days 
to maturity. Calculated for each day this proxy computed the variance 
on the observed futures rate by using the current observation and 
all previous observations. For example, the risk proxy at three days 
to maturity consisted of the variance of the futures rate calculated 
over the first three days ; at four days to maturity, the first four 
rates were used, and so on until the last observation represented a 
variance over the whole time series of the futures rate. 
Regression models and results 
Over all contracts, the plot of the difference between the futures 
rate and the forward rate illustrates a quadratic pattern over time. 
Therefore, two regressions were conducted using the proxies in both 
linear and quadratic form. The specifications were as follows; 
D = 3^ + 4- B^DTM + B^(DTM)^ (5.21a) 
and 
D = 3, 4- 3.C -r 3,a^ -f BJ3^^ . (5.21b) 
Table 5.4 shows the regression results for the model expressed in 
Equation 5.21a. The model was run once using the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression technique and then again using autoregression, 
T.LOI.C 5.4. Regression results of: the fiirst model: D -
———'— 
Contract 
^Ci 
C DTM 
Overall 15. 28 -2.01 -0.04 
(7.58)* (-3.13) *N ^  (-27.29)* 
12-20-79 3.29 -2.7) -1.12 
(0.30) (-0.6 3) (-6.64)* 
9-20-79 10 ,7 -0.65 -0.75 
(2 .06)* (-0.29) (-9.08)* 
6-21-79 70.05 -•13.73 -1.95 
(8.93)* (-4.15)*N (-15.33)* 
3-22-79 27 ,51 -5.50 -1.04 
(4.04)*N (-1.83) (-10.03)* 
12-21-78 45.81 -8.71 -1.79 
(8.51)* (-3.74)*N (-21.63)* 
9-21-70 18.04 -1.C7 -1.19 
(3.30)*N (-0.22) (-14.64)* 
6-22-70 7.92 -0.54 -0.67 
(2,46)*N (-0.40) (-12.82)* 
1-23-70 H.24 -0.68 -0.75 
(1.64) (-0.49) (-15.18)* 
12-22-77 -7.18 1.91 -0.58 
(-1.86) (l.j.'l) (-9.79)* 
9-22-77 9.48 -1.44) -0.60 
(.2.03) *N (-0./1) (-8.13)* 
6-23-77 -7.17 L..)3 -0.04 
(-1.17) (0.74) (-0.60) 
3-24-77 2Ï.85 -5.46 -0.72 
(7.33)* (-3.31) * (-14.44)* 
2 
B + B^C + BgDTM + B^(DTfl) 
2 2 
DTM R P 
0.003 .84 -0.77 
(27.53)* (-16.57)* 
0.003 .43 -0.859 
(4.90)*N (-22.24)* 
0.002 .73 -0.81 
(5.26)* (-18.49)* 
0.006 .74 -0.91 
(12.28)* (-29.09)* 
0.003 .67 -0.94 
(6.77)* (-36.76)* 
0.006 .77 -0.84 
(20.81)* (-20.99)* 
0.005 .69 -0.94 
(16.41)* (-35.72)* 
0.002 .64 -0.86 
(11.45)* (-21.90)* 
0.003 .78 -0.82 
(19.28) (-19.05) * 
0.003 .74 -0.84 
(14.10)* (-21.13)* 
0.003 .78 -0.78 
(13. 31) (-16.94)* 
0.0001 .02 -0.75 
(0.52) (014.96)* 
0.003 .69 -0.77 
(17.22)* (-16.37)* 
12-23-76 5.85 -0.86 -0.51 0.0002 .68 -0.75 
(1.67) {-0.56) (-9.51)* (13.18)* (-15.52)* 
9-23-76 -28. 1.5 
(-5.41) 
6.42 
(2.85)* 
0.55 
(6.68)* 
"0.002 
(-8.24)* 
.37 -0.87 
(-24.39)* 
^Indication that the t-\'alu<i becomes insignificant under a first-order auto-
r(!(/re3:3ive process. 
k 
Indication of signific£ince at the 5 percent level under ordinary least squares 
M 
w 
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right, the columns include the intercept, B^, transactions costs, C, 
2 
days to maturity, DTM, the quadratic term in days to maturity, (DTM) , 
2 
the coefficient of determination, R , and the coefficient of the first-
order autoregressive process, p. Within the table are the coefficients 
on these variables below which, in parentheses, are the t-statistics 
which test their significance from zero. The major variables of 
interest are the coefficients and t-values corresponding to C, DTM, 
2 
and (DTM) . 
Over all contracts, the results show that C is significant at 
the 5 percent level under CLS, as signified by the asterisk beside 
the t value. However, as noted by "N", the t-value becomes insig­
nificant at the 5 percent level when the model is run using an auto­
regressive process of the first order. The coefficient on the auto­
regressive process -0.77 is significant at the 5 percent level. These 
results are representative of all of the contracts. Of the 14 contracts, 
C is significant under CLE on only four contracts6-21-79 - 12-21-
78, 3-24-77, and 9-2 3-76. Even for these contracts, however, the 
coefficient on C becomes insignificant when the model is run using 
the autoregressive procedure. From these results, it is clear that 
commissions have little or nothing to do with the spread between 
the futures and forward rates. 
Unlike commissions cosrs, rhe days-ûo-maturity variable is, with 
two exceptions, significant under both estimating procedures. Over 
all contracts, DTM has a coefficient of -0.34 and a t-statistic of 
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-27.29. With the exception of the 9-23-76 contract, where the t-
statistic becomes insignificant under the autoregressive procedure, 
all coefficients on DTM are negative and significant. To capture 
the quadratic nature of the difference over time, DTM was raised to 
the second power and included in the analysis. The square of DTM 
increased rapidly and the coefficients on this variable were cor­
respondingly small. With the exception of the 12-20-79 contract, 
2 
each coefficient on (DTî-î)" was significant at the 5 percent level 
under OLS and autoregression. All coefficients were positive except 
for the 9-23-76 contract. 
2 
The results on DTM and (DTM) show that the holding period of 
the contract is a significant variable in the explanation of the 
spread between the futures and the forward rates over time. As DTM 
increases, the difference becomes negative indicating that the for­
ward rate rises relative to xhe futures. The opposite, however, is 
2 
true with (DTM) . It is difficult to draw any strong implications 
regarding DTM and the nature of the risk premium. Because of the 
reversal in the signs on the two coefficients, little can be said 
about positive or negative risk aversion. The safest conclusion that 
can be rendered from the analysis is that if DTM is in fact a true 
proxy for the rzsx associazsd with rriargin account, then it is 
apparent from the regression results that this type of risk is a 
significant variable in the explanation of the futures-forward 
difference. 
The coefficient of determination for each regression was reported 
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and all t-statistics on the coefficient of the first-order auto-
regressive process, p, were significant. In other words, the time 
series data had autocorrelated disturbances. This was the major 
reason why various t-values were inflated un.der OLS and became in­
significant when the autoregressive procedure was used. 
The results of the model expressed in Equation 5.21b are shown 
in Table 5.5, the format of which is similar to Table 5.4. As a 
proxy for risk, this model used the time-series variance on the 
futures rate. With regard to C, the coefficients are significant 
only over all contracts and for the 6-21-79 contract; otherwise,- they 
are insignificant at the 5 percent level. 
2 
Over all contracts, neither a ^ nor a , were significant under 
r r 
OLS at the 5 percent level. For each of the eight most recent 
contracts, the coefficients that were significant under OLS became 
insignificant when the variables were transformed under auto-
rearessicn. Only four of the contract? hmn significant coefficients 
under OLS that did not become insignificant under autoregression: 
1 -22-77, 9-22-77, 3-24-77, and 12-23-75. The coefficients that were 
significant were consistent in terms of their signs with the results 
of Table 5.4. The coefficients of determination were low and the 
autoregressive parameters were all significant. 
None of the variables used in -che second model is consistently 
significant. Commissions costs are insignificant, and as a measure o 
risk, the time-series variance is also unsignificant. The standard 
Tc-il)lo 5. IS. Raciression results o i :  the second 
Contract C 
O v e r a - 3 9 . 3 6  1 1 . 9 6  
(-3.07)* '4.79)* 
12-20-79 -44.91 6.73 
(-2.05)* (1.23) 
9-20-79 29,60 -0.53 
(1,34) (-0.10) 
6-21-79 -774.99 108.96 
(-11.13)* (13.021 * 
3-22-79 -0,87 5.03 
(-0,10) (1.45) 
12-21-70 12.30 -1.10 
(0,83) (-0.30) 
9-21-78 207.45 -35.72 
(5.33)* (-3.84)*N 
6-22-70 33.59 -3.41 
(3.82)* (-1.57) 
3-23-78 23.05 -5.17 
(0,50) (-0.65) 
12-22-77 78.54 -12.27 
(5.48)*N (-3.64)* 
2 
model; D = D + B C -t B O + B O 
0 1 z J j-i 
o a R 
-4.21 
(-0.31)Na 
4.49 
(0.99) 
-21.84 
(-2.24)* 
481.69 
(8.47)*N 
-31.03 
(-5.33)*N 
-14.12 
(-1.78) 
-194.26 
(-6.01)* 
-99.70 
(-6.87)*N 
-25.93 
(-0.44) 
-156.65 
(-9.37)* 
5.05 
(1.54) 
-0.66 
(-3.00)*N 
0.87 
(0.77) 
-78.78 
(-6.64)*N 
2 . 6 8  
(3.67)*N 
-0.13 
(-0.13) 
37.70 
(5.60)*N 
33.90 
(6.01)*N 
1.33 
(0.07) 
53.88 
(11.06)* 
.37 
.59 
.39 
.70 
.50 
.56 
.32 
.47 
.06 
,53 
"0.88 
(-25.07)* 
-0.81 
(-18.03)* 
-0.91 
(-29.77)* 
-.78 
(-16.34)* 
-0.95 
(-40.89)* 
-0.91 
( - 2 8 . 6 2 ) *  
-0.94 
(-37.57)* 
-0.86 
(-22.16)* 
-0.95 
(-45.16)* 
-0.83 
(-20.03*) 
9-22-77 !i.72 -0, , 13 -49.76 24.39 .72 -0.85 
(0.58) (-0. 05) (-5.29) * (10.45)* (-21.33)* 
6-2:;-77 -8.92 1, 75 -0.13 -0.13 .01 -0.75 
(0. 138) (-0.02) (-0.08) (-14.98)* 
3-24-77 10.01 -1 03 -17.15 2.83 .72 -0.74 
(3.21)*N (-0 .79) (-9.68) * (13.68)* (-14.55)* 
12-2.1-76 15 .62 -2 .32 -16.73 1.88 .80 -0.65 
(4.39)*M ("2 , L3)*N (-12.55) * (16.91)* (-11.55)* 
9-2.}-7() 1.42 0 , 17 -6.67 0.84 .03 -0.91 
(0.22) (0. 06) (-1.36) (1.14) (-28.81)* 
^Indication that; the t-va lue ! bccoines insignificant under a first-order autoregressive process 
* 
Indication of: significance at the 5 percent level under ordinary least squares. 
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power with respect to the difference between the futures rates and 
the forward rates over time. From these results, littl_ c.^n be con­
cluded regarding observed difference in the two rates over time. 
Summary descriptive statistics and regression analysis 
The objective of the empirical analysis was twofold: to test 
for the significance of the difference between the futures rate and 
the forward rate ever time and secondly,- to test for the significance 
of transactions costs and a risk premium as variables which explain 
the observed difference over time. 
The results clearly indicated that the difference between the two 
rates over time was significantly different from zero. Although the 
difference at the time of maturity was close to zero, it became nega­
tive as the days to maturity increased. The cost of commissions did 
not enter as a significant variable under either model or type of 
procedure. Although, as a measure of risk, days to maturity was a 
highly significant variable in the model for explaining me dif­
ference, the time-series variance was not. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUI4MARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
This study was initiated to examine the structure of prices 
existing between the SO-day Treasury bill futures market and the cash 
market for Treasury bills. Questions concerning the value of 
information produced in the futures market, the effects of futures 
trading on the cash market, and market efficiency provided the initial 
stimulus for the inquiry. The study included three major objectives. 
The first was to construct a theoretical model of the equilibrium 
futures price based on arbitrage relationships between the cash and 
futures markets. Based on the theoretical analysis, the second 
objective involved the derivation of logical conclusions and testable 
hypotheses concerning the structure of futures and cash prices. 
Specific hypotheses regarding the difference between the futures rate 
and the forward rate implied in the Treasury bill yield curve were 
presented. To satisfy the third objective, standard statistical 
techniques were used to test for the validity of the behavioral 
relationships derived from the model. 
Conceptual model 
Composed of two parts, the emphasis of the first part of the 
analysis centered on the (arbitrage) development of the equilibrium, 
futures price, given existing cash prices. An expression for tlie 
equilibrium futures price, FP*, was derived under two conditions—one 
where transactions costs were zgncrec and rhe other where they were 
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included. The derivation showp^ thr.t when transectîrmç cost^ were 
included in the model, the equilibrium futures price was surrounded 
by a band of prices within which arbitrage was not profitable. 
In ti.2 second part of the analysis, attention was giv^.^n to the 
major differences which distinguish a futures contract from a for­
ward contract. For example, it was shown that the daily resettlement 
process of the margin account was unique to futures markets and intro­
duced an element of risk not present in forward transactions. Ignored 
by previous authors, the uncertainty generated by the margin account 
was incorporated into the conceptual framework using an expected 
utility approach. As a result, it was found that the observed futures 
rate included a premium for risk. 
With the inclusion of risk and transactions costs in the model, the 
structure of yields between the futures and cash markets was re­
evaluated. Three specific hypotheses were derived from the model. 
The first stated that the observed future? rate was composed of three 
components—the risk-free futures rate, transactions costs, and a 
risk premium. It was maintained that the forward rate was similar only 
to the risk free part of the futures rate. To test the first 
hypothesis, the difference between the futures rate and the forward 
rate was tested for its significance from zero- The second and third 
hypotheses postulated that transactions costs and the risk premium 
were significant variables in the explanation of the difference over 
time. These hypotheses were analyzed using regression techniques 
and the coefficients on transactions costs and tlie risk variables were 
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tested for their significance from zero. 
Empirical analysis 
The empirical work analyzed 14 contracts which traded during the 
period from January, 1976, to December 1979. The data set consisted 
of 2463 observations on the futures and forward rates, the difference 
between them, days to maturity, and a time series variance of the 
observed futures rate. 
The first part of the statistical analysis consisted of summary 
statistics which analyzed the difference between the futures rate and 
the forward rate by contract, over the average of all contracts and 
over time. It was found that at the maturity date of the futures 
contract, the two rates were identical but diverged as the days prior 
to maturity of the contract increased. Forward contracts traded at a 
premium relative to futures, and over time, the difference (futures 
rates minus forward rates), averaged approximately -30 basis points 
and exhibited a quadratic pattern as days iio maturity increased. The 
difference was tested for its significance from zero by contracts 
and over time. The test statistics clearly indicated that tl"ié differsn 
between the futures and the forward rates was significantly different 
from zero. This was the conclusion that was expected because ir was 
hypothesized that the existence of transactions costs and risk premi^jms 
would cause a divergence between the futures rate and the forward rate. 
The conclusions based on the summary statistics led -co the second 
part of zhe empirical work, which consisted of regression analyses 
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explaining the pattern of the difference over time. According to the 
second and third hypotheses of the model, transactions costs and a 
risk premium were used in regression models of the difference between 
futures and forward rates. Transactions costs were represented by 
commissions charges incurred in the futures market and two proxies 
for risk were used, in two separate models. The data used were time 
series and each specification of the regression models was analyzed 
using ordinary least squares regression techniques and autoregressive 
procedures. The coefficients on the independent variables were tested 
for their significance from zero. It was found that the fixed costs 
of commissions were not significant in the explanation of the dif­
ference. One of the proxies for the risk premium., days to maturity, 
was found to be highly significant; however, the second proxy, a 
time-series variance of the observed futures rate, was insignificant. 
The results showed that as a measure for the risk associated with 
the accouiiL, days-tc-maturity is a significant variable 
which explains the difference between the observed futures rate and 
its risk-free counterpart, the forward rate. 
General Conclusions 
According to the theoretical model presented in this study, com­
missions costs and risk represent two variables which are signifi-
cajnt to tiie analysis of the price structure existing between the 
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empirical work confirms the significance of the risk premium but dis­
counts the importance of transactions costs. Based on the theoretical 
ai id empirical findings, it Tt>ust be concluded that risk is a signifi­
cant variable that affects the value of the observed futures rate 
vis a vis the forward rate. It must be further concluded that price 
analysis of the futures market should include the risk premium as a 
significant variable. For example, tests of market efficiency which 
analyze only the futures and forward rates and which ignore the role 
played by uncertainty are likely to be biased in their results. This 
study suggests that, on the basis of uncertainty, there is reason to 
believe that even in an efficient market, the futures rate may be sig­
nificantly different from the forward rate. 
The empirical results clearly indicate that futures prices are 
directly related to prices in the cash market for Treasury bills. 
The link is established due to the potential for arbitrage between the 
two mar];ctc. ?rcr. this, it c?" concluded that a relationship exists 
'-•.'hereby the effects of futures trading will be transmitted to the 
cash market and vice versa. With respect to the concerns of the U.S. 
Treasury and the Federal Reserve system, the question then becomes, 
does futures market activity have a stabilizing or destabilizing ef­
fect on the spot market. To answer this, the price effects of specu­
lation and hedging need to be analyzed. 
The relationship between the futures rate, forward rate, and 
tne risk premium zezmz to suggest that even though the futures and 
forward rates are nor identical, rhey are consistent. The information 
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produced in the futures market and embodied in the observed futures 
price seems to reflect similar information provided by the forward 
rates implied in the cash market. The consistency between these two 
sources of expectations of future short-term interest rates is im­
portant because futures market information is readily available at a 
very low cost, whereas the calculation of forward rate expectations 
is time-consuming and expensive. With respect to the value of infor­
mation produced by the futures market, further analysis needs to be 
conducted to determine whether or not the futures rates provide 
unbiased estimates of short-term rates expected to prevail in the 
future. 
Future Research 
Needs 
The conclusions of this study are tempered by various debilities 
of the analysis. For example, the equilibrium price of a futures con­
tract was determined on the basis of partial equilibrium analysis, 
given cash prices. In a disequilibrium situation, it was the futures 
price, not the cash price, that changed. This fact led to the con­
clusion that individual investors expected a net interest gain in 
their margin accounts. Hcv/ever, i;i disequilibrium situations, it 
may be the cash prices that change, instead of the futures price. 
And perhaps, even more likely, both cash and futures prices may change 
simultaneously in the movement towards a dynamic, two-market equilibrium. 
These considerations do not change the basic conclusion zhat risk is 
150 
an important component in the observed futures price. However, the 
analysis of the static and dynamic relationship between futures and 
cash prices might be better served on the basis of a general 
equilibrium analysis which emphasizes the simultaneous determination 
of equilibrium cash and futures prices. 
The empirical testing of behavioral relationships is often made 
difficult by the fact that many economic variables are had to quantify. 
In the present study, the major obstacle in the empirical analysis 
was the measurement of the risk premium. Of the two variables used as 
a proxy for the risk premium, only days-to-maturity was significant 
in the analysis. It might be argued that this variable represented 
no more than a trend in the time series analysis; however, the 
results of the autoregressive estimation procedures indicated that 
days-to-maturity was a significant explanatory variable. Although 
it was expected that the time-series variance of the observed futures 
idCc wXpuXU CIXS>U UC L. » J L C  WGS» llOU. iUdV iidvc: L-liC 
result of inadequate data. Because the data on the futures rate were 
limited to the daily settlement prices of the futures contracts, only 
an inter-day time-series could be calculated. Perhaps, a better 
proxy for risk would have been a cross-sectional variance based on 
price information on all intra-day trades. These data were unavailable. 
The challenge for future research is to derive a proxy for risk which 
more accurately represents the elements of the subjective utility 
function and the variance of the return on the futures position. 
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other kinds of risk in the futures and the forward market transactions 
are ignored in the preceding analysis. Especially with regard to 
fcr-.-.*ard transactions,- which occur not on an organized exchange, but 
between individual parties, further research is needed to evaluate 
risk and its effect on the price structure of the market. 
The intensive study of an economic problem provides the in­
vestigator with the capacity to evaluate the relative importance 
of various concepts. In this study, the analysis of the futures-
cash price structure was based on arbitrage relationships between the 
two markets. Arbitrage, however, is only one aspect of the Treasury' 
bill futures market. The study of hedging and speculation, if they 
can be so easily distinguished, is just as important as questions 
regarding market efficiency, the value of futures market information, 
or the effect of futures trading on the cash market. 
The futures market for Treasury securities is a new and inno­
vative tool for the management of interest rate risk. Many financial 
institutions are unaware of or unprepared to capitalize on the oppor­
tunities provided by this market. They are unfamiliar with futures 
markets and their role in reducing market risk. Research is needed 
to analyze hedging and risk management, basis relationships over time, 
market strategies, futures accounting, and other operational aspects 
of the market. 
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APPENDIX A: FUTURES CONTRACTS AND FORWARD RATE 
SPECIFICATIONS 
T.able A. 1. Spot market treasury bills used in calculating forward rates 
Matched Bills 
Futures Nearby 4-
(Contract Nearby 3 months 
Interpolated Bills 
lïèarby Nearby + 
3 months 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Number of 
Observations 
Matched 
— 
— —— 
— 
12-20-7') 12 -20-79 3-20 -80 12-11 -79 1 - 8-80 3- 4-80 4— 1—80 62 
9-20-79 9 -20-79 12-20 -79 9-10 -79 10 -16-79 12-11-80 1- 8-80 63 
6-21-7') 6 "21-79 9-20 -79 5- 29 -79 6 -26-79 9-18-79 10-16-79 62 
3-22-79 3 -22-79 6-21 -79 3- 6 - 79 4 - 3-79 5-29-79 6-26-79 62 
12-21-713 12 -21-7B 3-22 -79 12-12 -78 1 - 9-79 3- 6-79 4- 3-79 62 
9-21-7)3 9 -21-78 12-21 -70 9- 19 -70 10 -17-78 12-12-78 1- 9-79 64 
6-22-713 f. -22- 78 9-21 -78 5- 30 -78 6 -27-78 9-19-78 10-17-78 63 
3-23-7:3 3 -23- 78 6-22 -78 3- 7 -78 4 - 4-78 5-30-78 6-27-78 61 
12-22-77 12 22- 77 3-23 -78 12- 13 -77 1 -10-78 3- 7-78 4- 4-78 62 
9-22-77 9 -22- 77 12-22 -77 9- 20 -77 10 -10-77 12-13-77 1-10-78 63 
6-23-77 6 -23- 77 9-22 -77 ÎI.- 31 -77 6 -28-77 9-20-77 10-18-77 64 
3-24-77 3 -24- 77 6-23 -77 3- 8 - 1 1  4 - 5-77 5-31-77 6-28-77 64 
12-23-76 12 -23- 76 3-24 -77 12-14 -76 1 -11-77 3- 8-77 4- 5-77 62 
9-23-76 9 -23- 76 12-23 -76 9-21 -76 10 -19-76 12-14-76 1-11-77 64 
Mis-
Matched Total 
113 
114 
106 
120 
117 
112 
105 
115 
117 
115 
106 
116 
119 
114 
175 
177 
168 
182 
179 
176 
168 
176 
179 
178 
170 
180 
181 
178 
M Ul 
VD 
Y i (} 1 (J 
Yield Curve 
General form for the 
Days to Maturity (D) 
(D"-D*) (y*-) + (D^-D"-) (yU) 
linear interpolation of y*: ^ 
I'Lcjuic A.I. I'ho casli maikot; yield cuirvo and (:ha general form for the linear interpolation of 
(D^'D^) 
Table A. 2. Equations l;or the linear interpolation of cash market yields (used to calculate implied 
iJoi.-ward rates) , by contract 
Equations for the linear interpolation of cash market yields corresponding to;^ 
90 days following the maturity date 
Contract The maturity date of the futures contract of the futures contract 
12-20-79 r: ( (20 X 4 (10 X ( (13 X 
^NL^ 
4- (17 X 
9-19-79 = ( (27 X 4 ( 3 X ( (20 X 
^NL^ 
4- (10 X 
6-%L-79 (( 6 X Y ) 
ML 
4 (24 X — ((27 X 
^NL^ 
4- ( 3 X 'Nu')/29 
3-42-79 ( (13 X Y ) 
ML 
4- (17 X = (( 6 X 
^NL^ 
4- (24 >: 
12-21-70 ((20 X Y ) 
ML 
(10 X = ( (13 X 
^NL^ 
4- (17 JC ?Nul'/2S 
9-21-78 ((27 X Y ) 
ML 
-r ( 3 X = ((20 X 4- (10 X V„u)l/29 
6-22-78 = (( 6 X Y ) 
MI, 
•r  (24 X Y„„))/29; = ((27 X 
^NL^ 
4- ( 3 X 
3-23-78 t= ((13 X V ) f/IL •t- (17 X 
= (( 6 X Y ) 
NL 
4- (24 :c \u))/25 
12-22-77 r : ( (20 X y ) 
ML 
4- (10 X ((13 X Y ) NL 
4- (17 ;t 
9-22-77 V 
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APPENDIX B: GRAPHS OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FUTURES AND 
FORWARD RATES FOR EACH CONTRACT BY DAYS-TO-MATURITY 
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